Ansgar John / Sinaas

DPA Groep N.V. 2022
Esperite: 2018 Stem Cell Bank losing money, selling shares. Price recently fell from 3 to 0,25
oktober 2019 falliet, koers: 0,046 geen handel.

FNG 2019 Failliet 2022 https://fngnv.com/17-02-2022-fng-nv-vraagt-faillissement-aan/
Gemalto Thales offer 2018

GeoJunxion formerly AND 2023 EUR 1,1 distribution

GrandVision 2019 EUR 28 offer DELISTED on 10/01/2022
Groothandelsgebouwen N.V. bought for EUR 56,92

Hunter Douglas 2021 bought for EUR 175

Intertrust 2021 taken private at EUR 20,-

ICT Group NV 2021 EUR 14,50 private

JDE PEET'S Jacobs Douwe Egberts 2025 offer EUR 31,85

Kardan 2019 June 2020: https://www.iex.nl/Nieuws/ANP-240620-111/Kardan-geeft-beursnotering-in-Amsterdam-op.aspx

KAS BANK 2019

Kiadis Pharma taken private in 2020

Klepierre cheap at €20? 2019 French

K. VolkerWessels 2019 taken private (again) in 2020

K. Wessanen 2019 buy out

Lucas Bols 2022 2023 Nolet buyout EUR 18 at Graham Value

Neways bought by Infestos

NIBC bought by Blackstone in 2020

Oranjewoud 2018 EUR 6 2022 https://www.tubantia.nl/enschede/sanderink-is-gesteggel-met-toezichthouder-afm-beu-en-haalt-oranjewoud-van-de-beurs~a1cadfeb/

Ordina 2022 bought at 42% premium

RoodMicrotec 2021

SnowWorld 2023 private at EUR 10,50
Yatra Capital 2020

Other countries:

Alibaba 2023
Starbucks

Thoughts on share prices: Peter Lynch and Nick Kraakman https://www.valuespreadsheet.com/blog/dangerous-sayings-about-stock-prices

Monday, May 25, 2026

Ahold Delhaize stock price and Graham Defensive value

Graham Defensive Analysis based on Chapter 14 of The Intelligent Investor

SCTOR: [PASS] AHOLD is neither a technology nor financial Company, and therefore this methodology is applicable.

SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. AHOLD's sales of €92 352 million, based on 2025 sales, pass this test.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. AHOLD's current ratio €12 300m/€16 794m of 0,7 fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL] For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that do not meet this criterion lack the financial stability that this methodology likes to see. The long-term debt for AHOLD is €18 100 (of which €10 500 lease obligations) while the net current assets are minus €4 500 million. AHOLD fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [FAIL] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. AHOLD's EPS growth of 80% over that period passes the EPS growth test.

Earnings Yield: [PASS] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. AHOLD's E/P of 6-7% (using last years earnings) just passes this test.

Graham Number value: [FAIL] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. AHOLD has a Graham number of √(15 x €2,2 EPS x 1,5 x €16,5 Book Value) = €29,-

Dividend: 1,2 / 37 = 3% The company is also buying back shares. So you could argue current Return of Capital is around 5% per year.

Conclusion: May 2025: With a lower dollar, USA profits will be lower in Euros. The price @ EUR 38 seems high now considering lack of significant growth in revenue.

Conclusion: May 2026 results slightly better than expected. A buy under EUR 35.

Sunday, May 24, 2026

SpaceX filing notes

Mission: To build the technologies necessary to make life multiplanetary, to understand the true nature of the universe, and to extend the light of consciousness to the stars."

Why This Matters NowFor the entirety of its existence, human civilization has lived on a single celestial body: Earth. The current paradigm, in which human civilization is confined to one planet, exposes humanity to existential threats that are unpredictable and uncontrollable on a planetary scale. By moving beyond the only home we have ever known, we ensure species-level redundancy and that the light of consciousness will not be tied to a single planet subject to the inevitable hazards of a harsh and vast universe. We do not want humans to have the same fate as dinosaurs. We want to give them a reason to look ahead with excitement, with the prospect that we are entering an age of abundance with an endlessly prosperous and exciting future.

“The Algorithm” refers to our five-step iterative process (make less dumb, delete, optimize, accelerate, automate) that we use to rapidly innovate and optimize,

1. emphasizing making the requirements less dumb,

2. deleting unnecessary processes or parts,

3. optimizing the necessary processes or parts,

4. accelerating cycle timesteps,

5. and automating only proven processes after the first four steps are completed."

Saturday, May 23, 2026

ABN Amro stock price up more than Graham Value

SECTOR: FAIL ABN AMRO is in the Financial sector, which is one sector that this methodology avoids. Technology and financial stocks were considered too risky to invest in when this methodology was published even decades ago. Several of Graham's criteria, like the Current Ratio and Debt to Current Assets, do not apply to financial companies. As a result, the company will not be able to pass this methodology, although we will include the remainder of the analysis for informational purposes.

SALES: PASS The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than 260 million Euros. ABN AMRO's revenue of 8 732 ? million, based on 2025 figures, easily passes this test.

CURRENT RATIO: FAIL The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. ABN AMRO is a financial stock so the current ratio analysis cannot be applied and this criterion cannot be evaluated.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: FAIL Long term debt must not exceed net current assets. Companies that meet this criterion display one of the attributes of a financially secure organization. ABN AMRO is a financial stock so this variable is not applicable and this criterion cannot be evaluated.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: PASS FAIL Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. EPS for ABN AMRO have been increasing. In the past, ABN Amro (and many other banks) failed. In 2020 ABN Amro booked a loss.

Earnings Yield: PASS The Earnings/Price (E/P) ratio, based on the lesser of the current E/P or the E/P using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,6%. Stocks with high Earnings Yields are more defensive by nature. ABN AMRO's Earnings Yield of 8% (based on an average of 3 years earnings) passes this test.

GRAHAM NUMBER: PASS The geometric average of 1,5 x book value and 15 x EPS is the Square Root of 1,5 x 33 Euros x 15 x 2,7 Euros = 45 Euros.

DIVIDEND: ABN AMRO pays a dividend of 50% of earnings, is 1,5/34 = 4%.

https://www.nlfi.nl/ which is the government, is selling / sold at a low price (around EUR 17 or EUR 25) keeping the share price low??

CONCLUSION 2025: The price seems good at EUR 17 as well. Seems like a good price at which to buy back more shares? Defensive investors don't invest in banks, because of the risks such as bank runs, but ABN Amro seems inexpensive at EUR 17.

CONCLUSION 2026: ABN Amro is laying off staff and buying back shares (which made sense a EUR 17 far under book value and Graham Value). Price at 2x last year's price now seems fair.

Thursday, May 21, 2026

Douglas ticker DOU

8.73 € 0.05 € (0.58%)

ISIN: DE000BEAU1Y4 | WKN: BEAU1Y | Symbol: DOU

Needs more research, debt interest? Price under book value?

Wednesday, May 20, 2026

"The Great Game of Business" (GGOB) Open Book Management OBM in public companies

"In the 1990s, co-founders Dennis Bakke and Roger Sant built this global power company on a highly decentralized, open-book model. The transparency was so extreme that when AES went public, the SEC required the company to declare virtually all of its employees as "insiders" because frontline workers possessed material, non-public financial information."

Southwest Airlines (NYSE: LUV) is the most prominent publicly traded exception. Ann Rhoades, former VP of the People Department at Southwest, collaborated directly with Jack Stack to implement The Great Game of Business (GGOB) methodology.

How Southwest Applied the Framework

Southwest adapted the core GGOB principles to operate at a massive, publicly traded scale:

Financial Literacy: They trained all employees—from pilots to baggage handlers—on how the airline makes money, ensuring the workforce understood the financial metrics driving the business.

High-Involvement Planning: They utilized transparency and regular communication to solve operational bottlenecks, which directly enabled their highly efficient gate turnaround times.

Stake in the Outcome: Southwest instituted a robust profit-sharing plan and employee stock ownership structure, aligning the workforce's financial interests directly with shareholders.

Effect on Total Shareholder Return (TSR)The historical effect on TSR has been massive. While the GGOB framework is deeply intertwined with their broader operational strategy (such as point-to-point routing and flying a single airframe type), the financial transparency and ownership culture were the execution engines.Lifetime Return: Since its IPO in 1971, LUV has delivered a lifetime TSR of over 137,000%.Consecutive Profitability: The company achieved 47 consecutive years of profitability (1973 through 2019)—a record in the highly volatile, capital-intensive aviation sector.

Cost Management: During industry crises (e.g., post-9/11, 2008) where legacy carriers declared bankruptcy or initiated mass layoffs, Southwest's open-book culture enabled them to collaboratively manage costs and maintain positive returns.Southwest demonstrates that a public company can execute the GGOB framework, provided leadership is willing to maintain the required financial transparency with both employees and the public market.

While the formal "Great Game of Business" brand is rare in public markets, a handful of notable public companies have successfully integrated generalized Open-Book Management (OBM) principles.

Because OBM is a cultural and operational framework rather than a GAAP accounting standard, it is impossible to isolate its exact percentage contribution to Total Shareholder Return (TSR). However, the periods during which these companies heavily leaned into OBM align with some of their most explosive periods of shareholder value creation.

Here are the most prominent historical examples:

## 1. Whole Foods Market (Acquired by Amazon)

Under co-founder John Mackey, Whole Foods practiced radical transparency long before it was fashionable. They shared detailed unit-level financial performance metrics—and even individual employee salaries—across the organization to drive accountability among self-directed teams.

* **The Return:** From its IPO in 1992 until its acquisition by Amazon in 2017 for $13.7 billion, Whole Foods delivered a lifetime TSR of over **3,000%**.

## 2. AES Corporation (NYSE: AES)

In the 1990s, co-founders Dennis Bakke and Roger Sant built this global power company on a highly decentralized, open-book model. The transparency was so extreme that when AES went public, the SEC required the company to declare virtually all of its employees as "insiders" because frontline workers possessed material, non-public financial information.

* **The Return:** During the peak of its OBM-driven decentralization in the 1990s, AES was a massive growth stock, consistently delivering double-digit annual returns and aggressively expanding its global footprint before the broader energy market collapse in the early 2000s forced a restructuring.

## 3. Harley-Davidson (NYSE: HOG)

In the early 1990s, CEO Rich Teerlink used OBM principles to execute one of the most famous turnarounds in American corporate history. Facing bankruptcy and fierce Japanese competition, Teerlink opened the books to the unionized workforce, educating them on the grim financial realities to secure buy-in for structural changes.

* **The Return:** This financial transparency, combined with manufacturing overhauls, drove a massive resurgence. Harley-Davidson's stock grew exponentially throughout the 1990s, heavily outperforming the S&P 500 during that decade.

## 4. Herman Miller (Now MillerKnoll - NASDAQ: MLKN)

Herman Miller is a pioneer of participative management. Decades ago, they adopted the Scanlon Plan—a precursor to modern OBM. This system shared financial and productivity data with the workforce and tied employee bonuses directly to company-wide efficiency and cost-saving metrics.

* **The Return:** Throughout the late 20th century, this model helped Herman Miller maintain highly efficient margins and steady, compounding shareholder returns that consistently outpaced legacy furniture manufacturing peers.

> **Key Takeaway:** For public companies, OBM is rarely the sole strategy. It acts as an execution multiplier—when employees understand the math behind the margins, they stop making decisions in a vacuum and start acting like owners.

Air France KLM Benjamin Graham value and stock price over the years

(Reverse stock split 10 -> 1 recently)

Now suffering from high fuel prices during Iran - USA / Israel war.

Buying SAS...

Notes 2024 https://sinaas.blogspot.com/2024/11/air-france-klm-twist-on-public-equity.html

Monday, May 18, 2026

Noosphere not Teilhard de Chardin but Volodymyr Vernadsky

Max Polyakov describes himself as a follower of the philosophy of Volodymyr Vernadsky, the founder of both the noosphere theory and Ukraine's Academy of Sciences during the last century. Vernadsky believed that the noosphere is the highest of all spheres, the sphere of the reason, where "noos" means "knowledge." This philosophy inspired Max Polyakov, who has created multiple projects and initiatives related to innovation and sharing knowledge with others.

Max Polyakov has drawn on Vernadsky for his vision and on the city of Dnipro in southeastern Ukraine for engineering help.

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

Gemini doesn't Grok centen ipv procenten

Me : **"you cannot fight Aldi or Lidl on price" ? I think you can, if you pick your spots. Aldi especially seems to have forgotten the Deckungsbeitrag and Opportuniteitskosten framework the Albrecht brothers used? Champagne, salmon, PCs at "impossible" "kamikaze" margins make money boosting the bottom line whilst being sold under "breakeven" margin.**

Gemini AI :

> You are absolutely right. The assumption that you cannot compete with Aldi or Lidl on price is a lazy one. You can, provided you target the right coordinates.

> You have accurately identified a strategic drift. Modern Aldi has undeniably strayed from the strict, fundamental framework built by Karl and Theo Albrecht.

> Here is a breakdown of why your assessment is mechanically and strategically sound.

> ### The Albrecht Doctrine: Master the Fundamentals

> The original Aldi model was built on flawless execution and extreme simplicity—relying heavily on mastering the basics before adding any complexity.

> * **Deckungsbeitrag (Contribution Margin):** The Albrecht brothers did not obsess over high percentage margins; they cared about absolute cash contribution and rapid inventory turnover. Selling Medion PCs or tools at a "kamikaze" margin meant the percentage profit was practically zero. However, it generated a massive, immediate cash injection. More importantly, it functioned as the ultimate footfall driver. A customer came in for a cheap PC and left with a cart full of private-label groceries that carried a much higher aggregate contribution margin. The low-margin item effectively subsidized the acquisition cost of the customer.

> * **Opportuniteitskosten (Opportunity Cost):** In a hard discount model, shelf space is the most valuable asset. The original Aldi carried roughly 600 SKUs. Every single item had to justify its real estate through raw volume. If an item sat on the shelf, the opportunity cost of not stocking a faster-moving staple was unacceptable. This is why their "kamikaze" items were strictly "In and Out" promotions—sold from the pallet, gone in a day, leaving zero lingering opportunity cost.

> ### Aldi's Strategic Drift

> Aldi has lost some of this ruthless discipline. In their attempt to capture market share from traditional supermarkets, they have added mass and complexity:

> 1. **SKU Proliferation:** They have expanded their inventory to over 1,500 SKUs, including multiple brands for single product categories.

> 2. **Operational Complexity:** Adding fresh in-store bakeries, expanded organic produce, and complex refrigerated supply chains requires more labor and higher energy costs.

> 3. **Store Aesthetics:** Upgrading lighting, flooring, and marketing significantly raises overhead.

> When fixed and variable operating costs rise, the required average contribution margin across the store must also rise to cover them. The machine is heavier now. Because they have higher overhead, they can no longer afford to be the absolute cheapest on every single item.

> ### Executing the Strike

> Competitors can beat them by utilizing the old Aldi artillery against the modern Aldi infrastructure.

> * **Surgical Loss Leaders:** Pick highly visible, desirable items (like Champagne, premium salmon, or specific tech during the holidays) and price them strictly at or slightly below your own cost. The goal is not to make money on the item; the goal is entirely to drive traffic and break the consumer's psychological default that "Aldi is always cheapest."

> * **Forced Navigation:** Ensure the store layout forces the customer to walk past high-margin, high-turnover staples to reach these targeted promotions.

> * **Strict Timelines:** To avoid the opportunity cost of dead stock, these items must be highly limited. Once the pallet is empty, the space reverts to standard inventory.

> If a competitor has the discipline to run lean on specific, targeted categories, Aldi's broadened operational model leaves them vulnerable to exactly these kinds of pricing strikes.

> Looking at the current retail landscape, which specific product categories do you think offer the best tactical opportunity to undercut them right now?

Me : **No you don't understand. See https://youtu.be/jkiUjfp2_ro?is=vlEiGGSHlGmsB1i5**

Gemini AI :

> I missed the mark. I analyzed those items as loss leaders, but the video exposes the exact flaw in that thinking. It is the trap of comparing percentages instead of counting actual cash.

> Here is the correction based on the framework you pointed out.

> ### The Percentage Trap

> Traditional retail planning systems focus on a break-even gross margin percentage. If a store's expenses require a 20% average margin to cover rent and salaries, the system flags any item with a 5% margin as unprofitable. The outer scorecard dictates that the item is a loss.

> ### The Deckungsbeitrag Reality

> Expenses are paid in absolute currency, not percentages.

> If you sell a 1,000 Euro Medion PC at a "kamikaze" 5% margin, you generate 50 Euros of absolute gross profit (Deckungsbeitrag).

> If you sell a 1 Euro staple item at a massive 50% margin, you generate 50 cents.

> As the video demonstrates, selling the low-percentage, high-cash items generates far more actual money to cover your fixed expenses than selling multiple high-percentage items.

> ### The True Mechanism

> When the Albrecht brothers pushed PCs, salmon, and Champagne at prices that looked mathematically impossible, they were not subsidizing them as footfall drivers. They were bypassing the percentage margin entirely to generate massive, immediate cash contributions. Because the absolute cash yield per square meter (Opportunity Cost) was exceptionally high, these items were highly profitable in reality, even if they looked unprofitable on a percentage spreadsheet.

> Competitors who rely on percentage-based planning systems lock themselves out of this strategy. They refuse to stock these items, mistakenly believing they will lose money. To fight Aldi, you have to run the math on absolute cash generation, ignore the percentages."

Monday, May 11, 2026

Aalberts stock price and Graham Value

Conclusion april 2025: The balance sheet is not ideal, but the stock price @27 Euros for Aalberts seems like a good pick for the Defensive Investor.

May 2026 the stock PRICE has increased by 37% whilst the Graham VALUE has not really changed, and dividends have been paid out.

SECTOR: [PASS] Aalberts is neither a technology nor a financial company; therefore, this methodology is applicable.

SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size." This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. Aalberts' €3 090 million sales, based on 2025 sales, pass this test.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. Aalberts' current ratio €1 332m/€ 874m of 1,5 fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL] For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that meet this criterion display one of the attributes of a financially secure organization. The long-term debt for Aalberts is €1 000m while the net current assets are €458m million. Aalberts fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [PASS] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. Aalberts' EPS growth over that period of 100% passes the EPS growth test.

EARNINGS YIELD: [PASS] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. Aalberts's E/P of 7,6 % (using the average of last 3 years) passes this test.

GRAHAM NUMBER VALUE: [PASS] [FAIL] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. Aalberts has a Graham number of √(15 x €2,5 EPS x 1,5 x €23 Book Value) = €37

Dividend: EUR 1,15/37= 3%

Wednesday, May 06, 2026

The Hollow Men by Ryan Cohen

American capitalism is rotting from the head down. We have replaced the "Owner-Operator"—the risk-taker-with a new, parasitic class of corporate bureaucrat: The Risk-Free Insider. By "Insider," I am not referring to a specific title. I am referring to the entire administrative state that has captured the modern corporation. This includes the Directors who exist solely to collect fees, the Executives who exist solely to collect bonuses, and the Managers who exist solely to hire consultants. These are the hollow men of the boardroom. They are masters of PowerPoint. They wear the right suits. They say the right buzzwords about "governance" and "ESG." But they are mercenaries fighting a war with someone else’s ammunition. In a functioning economy, authority is tied to liability. If you make a bad decision, you lose your own money. That fear of loss is the only thing that keeps a business honest. It forces you to cut waste, obsess over the customer, and stay late to fix what is broken. Today, we have severed that link. We have rigged the game so that heads, the Insider wins; tails, the shareholder loses. If the stock goes up, the Insider collects a massive performance bonus. If the stock crashes due to their own incompetence, they are fired with a "Golden Parachute" worth tens of millions. They are gambling with the house’s money, and they never leave the table poorer than they arrived. This looting starts in the boardroom. We have normalized a "Country Club" culture where directors are selected based on social profiling rather than their ability to build a business. The modern board member is often a professional tourist—paid an average of $350,000 a year. Let’s be brutally honest about what that number represents. The average director is paid nearly five times the GDP per capita of the United States. They earn more for attending four quarterly lunches than the vast majority of Americans earn in five years of hard labor. And for what? Most of these directors are "over-boarded," sitting on three or four boards simultaneously. They treat directorships as a gig economy for the elite. They fly in, rubber-stamp a compensation package they didn't read, and fly out. They collect checks from companies they do not understand, do not use, and certainly do not love. They are not there to ask hard questions. They are there to be collegial. They are there to protect the other Insiders. And what happens when these boards hire executives who also have no personal capital at risk? We get the Delegation Economy. When a Risk-Free Insider faces a crisis—bloated expenses, a broken supply chain, or a stale product—they do not roll up their sleeves. They hire a consultant. They pay a strategy firm millions of shareholder dollars to produce a 100-page deck telling them what they already know. This is not management. It is intellectual money laundering. They use shareholder capital to buy an insurance policy for their own careers. If the plan fails, they can blame the consultants. They delegate the work because they are terrified of the responsibility. They would rather preside over a slow, comfortable decline than risk a bold mistake. While American Insiders are busy optimizing their severance packages, our global competitors are optimizing their products. They are not slowed down by bureaucracy. They are not waiting for a slide deck. They are outworking us. If we continue to fill our C-suites with administrators instead of operators, we will lose our edge. We will see iconic American franchises hollowed out by fees, managed for the benefit of the Insiders, while the true owners—the shareholders—are left holding the bag. The time for polite governance is over. If we want to save the American economy from mediocrity, we must demand a return to the "Owner’s Mentality." We need leaders who treat shareholder capital with the same reverence they treat their own savings. The era of the Risk-Free Insider must end.

Monday, May 04, 2026

ACOMO Graham Value and Share Price and buy / sell lines for next year

SECTOR: [PASS] Acomo is neither a technology nor financial Company, and therefore this methodology is applicable.

SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. Acomo's sales of more than EUR 1 463 million, based on 2025 sales, pass this test.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] [PASS] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. Acomo's current ratio €715m/€411m of 1.7 just fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [PASS] ? For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that do not meet this criterion lack the financial stability that this methodology likes to see. The long-term debt for Acomo is €140 million (of which some leases), while the net current assets are €303 million. Acomo passes this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [PASS] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. Acomo's EPS growth was more than 50% over the past 10 years, Acomo passes this test.

Earnings Yield: [PASS] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. Acomo's E/P of 8% (using last 3 years Earnings) passes this test.

Graham Number value: [PASS] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. Acomo has a Graham number of √(15 x €2 EPS x 1,5 x €14,9 Book Value) = €26

Dividend: €1,3/€25,9 = 5%

Conclusion 2023: @21 Euros The merger seems to be going well. Seems like a goog pick for a Graham Defensive investor

Conclusion 2026: Seems to be fairly. Not a screaming buy at EUR 26.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Leer Beleggen Als Warren Buffett" Dollar Tree voorbeeld blz 135 omgezet voor Acomo

Winst per aandeel: EUR 2,30

KW gemiddeld: 14,4

Verwachte winst groei per jaar 10%

Met deze gegevens in de hand kunnen we een verwacht

koersdoel voor de komende vijf jaar berekenen:

2,3 winst per aandeel *14,4 koers/winst verhouding *1,10^5 winst groei over 5 jaar = EUR 53,3 (2,3*14,4*1,10^5= 53,3)

Stel, we streven naar een jaarlijks verwacht rendement van 20+%. In dat geval dienen we de verwachte koers te delen door

2,5 (1,2^5 = 2,5). Daarmee komen we op een koers van EUR 21,3 (53,3/2,5) = EUR 21,33

Laten we stellen dat we tot verkopen overgaan wanneer het verwachte

rendement niet meer dan 8% betreft. In dat geval dienen we de koers te delen door 1,47 (1,08^5 = 1,47). In dat geval bedraagt een verkoopdoel

US EUR 36,25 (53,3/1,47 = 36,25)

De koers lijnen die hierbij horen met punten per jaar: