Ansgar John / Sinaas

DPA Groep N.V. 2022
Esperite: 2018 Stem Cell Bank losing money, selling shares. Price recently fell from 3 to 0,25
oktober 2019 falliet, koers: 0,046 geen handel.

FNG 2019 Failliet 2022 https://fngnv.com/17-02-2022-fng-nv-vraagt-faillissement-aan/
Gemalto Thales offer 2018

GeoJunxion formerly AND 2023 EUR 1,1 distribution

GrandVision 2019 EUR 28 offer DELISTED on 10/01/2022
Groothandelsgebouwen N.V. bought for EUR 56,92

Hunter Douglas 2021 bought for EUR 175

Intertrust 2021 taken private at EUR 20,-

ICT Group NV 2021 EUR 14,50 private

Kardan 2019 June 2020: https://www.iex.nl/Nieuws/ANP-240620-111/Kardan-geeft-beursnotering-in-Amsterdam-op.aspx

KAS BANK 2019

Kiadis Pharma taken private in 2020

Klepierre cheap at €20? 2019 French

K. VolkerWessels 2019 taken private (again) in 2020

K. Wessanen 2019 buy out

Lucas Bols 2022 2023 Nolet buyout EUR 18 at Graham Value

Neways bought by Infestos

NIBC bought by Blackstone in 2020

Oranjewoud 2018 EUR 6 2022 https://www.tubantia.nl/enschede/sanderink-is-gesteggel-met-toezichthouder-afm-beu-en-haalt-oranjewoud-van-de-beurs~a1cadfeb/

Ordina 2022 bought at 42% premium

RoodMicrotec 2021

SnowWorld 2023 private at EUR 10,50
Yatra Capital 2020

Other countries:

Alibaba 2023
Starbucks

Thoughts on share prices: Peter Lynch and Nick Kraakman https://www.valuespreadsheet.com/blog/dangerous-sayings-about-stock-prices

Wednesday, October 02, 2024

Basic Fit math and letter and Benjamin Graham analysis

Graham Analysis will follow later.

Dear Members of the Board of Directors and Management: Buckley Capital Management, LLC, together with its affiliates (collectively, "we" or "Buckley"), is a long-term shareholder of Basic-Fit NV ("Basic-Fit" or the "Company"). As you know, Buckley Capital Management is a Miami-based investment firm specializing primarily in North American small and mid-cap value stocks. Our focus is on identifying and investing in high-quality companies with strong growth potential trading at an attractive value multiple. This typically means businesses that are trading below 10x earnings that are growing earnings more than 10% per year. The average PE multiple in our portfolio today is 9x with a 17% average earnings growth rate. We collaborate closely with boards and management teams to unlock value and drive sustainable long-term growth, benefiting all shareholders. We are trusted to manage capital on behalf of family offices, foundations, ultra-high net worth and high net worth individuals. In addition, with 95%+ of our Partners' investable net worth committed to our funds, we ensure a strong alignment of interests with our investors and the companies in which we invest. We have valued our ongoing dialogue with Basic-Fit's Chief Financial Officer, Hans Van Der Aar, and Investor Relations Manager, John David Roeg since August 2022, during which we have raised concerns and offered recommendations to drive the Company's long-term growth. In our most recent meeting on August 26th, 2024 in Amsterdam, we were disappointed to hear of the management's lack of interest in exploring a sale of the Company, especially given the significant value this would unlock. Based on conversations we have had with various industry participants, we are confident that there is significant interest from private equity, and we would implore Basic-Fit's management and the Board to initiate a strategic review process. Despite Basic-Fit's position as an industry leader[1] and its track record of growth, the Company continues to be significantly undervalued by the public markets. It is incumbent upon Basic-Fit's Board of Directors to determine the optimal path forward to create value for stakeholders, and we expect the Board to be open-minded about different strategic opportunities for change. In our view, Basic-Fit has a set of highly valuable assets that position the Company well to operate as a private entity, and it is important for the Board to consider the potential value-creation opportunities that a sale of the Company could offer. We have decided to release this letter publicly to initiate an open dialogue about our recommendation. By involving all stakeholders in this conversation, we can ensure that everyone has the opportunity to consider our views and offer input on how best to drive long-term value. Basic-Fit is an Industry Leader with an Outstanding Track Record and Significant Future Growth Potential[2] We initially decided to invest in Basic-Fit in August 2022 due to the high prospective growth rate in the business, the consistency and predictability of the business model, and the long runway for growth. Today, we are a top 20 shareholder, owning approximately 0.78% of the issued and outstanding shares in the capital of Basic-Fit. Basic-Fit is an expanding business in the growing European low-cost fitness market. Since its IPO in June 2016, Basic-Fit has been growing the business at around 20% annualized, with an outstanding track record of growth across all of its major KPIs[3]. During this period, and including the COVID pandemic years, Basic-Fit has grown its club base at a 19% CAGR, memberships at a 19% CAGR, revenues at a 22% CAGR, and underlying EBITDA less rent at 18%.[4] Basic-Fit has combined two important business concepts—the low-cost consumer-facing business, which includes some of the most significant value creators within the consumer space, such as Walmart, Amazon, and Costco; and the concept of local network effects and economies of scale, as seen in the telecom and cable industries—to create the leading low-cost gym operator in continental Europe. With approximately 1,500 gyms across six countries, it is the industry leader by a significant margin, with a Company footprint about three times the size of its next largest European competitor and about equal to the top three combined[5]. It operates the largest low-cost fitness network in each of France, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and has a rapidly growing Germany segment. With strong competitive advantages and significant brand awareness, the Company's mature clubs sustain strong unit economics, operating at over 45% EBITDA margins and 30% returns on invested capital.[6] The Company's strong growth is expected to continue in the near future, with analyst consensus[7] estimates for underlying EBITDA less rent expected to grow ~22% to a new record of €317 million in 2024 and to increase an additional 22% in 2025 to €386 million. Over the next decade, Basic-Fit's future will be even more exciting. Despite the Company's great success in growing its industry, fitness membership penetration remains relatively low in most of its European markets. Compared with 22% in the United States, fitness penetration in the Netherlands is 18%, in Denmark 13%, in Spain 12%, in France 11%, and in Belgium just 9%.[8] Increases in penetration will in our view also be fueled by increased awareness of health and wellness among millennials and Generation Z. With its very high returns on capital in its existing markets, Basic-Fit has a long runway to deploy capital in line with these trends. Moreover, the Company is exploring the possibility of franchising its brand in new markets, which will add to growth and margins. Significant Market Misalignment and Undervaluation Despite this rapid and high-quality historical growth and its great potential for future growth, Basic-Fit's stock has significantly underperformed indices and peers in the consumer discretionary vertical. As shown below, since January 2020, Basic-Fit's market price has declined 34%, underperforming the broader comparable market. Due to this underperformance, Basic-Fit now trades at just 6.5 times its next-twelve-month EBITDA estimates, a nearly 60% discount to comparable consumer discretionary companies serving a lower income consumer operating in North America and Europe.[9] Notably, the current share price does not even properly value the underlying profitability of Basic-Fit's club network at its current size, before considering growth from future new club additions.[10] We believe this undervaluation exists largely because of perception issues caused by recent shortfalls relative to short-term market expectations, as well as public investors' misunderstanding of the company's financial structure, particularly the distinction between financial debt and lease obligations. We believe investors are far too focused on immaterial short falls in the business, such as a small miss in FCF/share guidance in 2024, which has led to the share price being down almost 50% compared to its peak levels in 2022. While Basic-Fit has not hit every public guide it has put out, it has come close and grown the business at an extremely attractive long-term rate. [11] A Private Sale of Basic-Fit will Unlock Significant Value We do not view Basic-Fit as a company burdened by financial constraints that must seek a private equity lifeline. Rather, we view going private as a proactive opportunity for Basic-Fit to achieve several compelling goals: 1. Better execute its growth strategy without pressures from short-term market expectations 2. Achieve greater operational flexibility; to gain sharper focus on long-term value creation 3. Provide more strategic options for financing growth. As evident in its past track record, Basic-Fit has the potential to thrive as a private entity. As a private company, Basic-Fit would be able to grow at a faster pace to capture additional market share and focus more on the long-term strategic goals that are in the best interest of the Company, without being constrained by the short-term pressures of the public markets. This would be beneficial for the Company and the owners of the business given the 30% ROIC[12] on new gyms, but also Basic-Fit's employee base given the growth would create more jobs, increase stability, and free up more resources to dedicate to employee benefits, training and development programs. We believe the gap between Basic-Fit's current valuation and its significant long-term upside will allow a private buyer to make an offer for the Company at a significant premium to today's stock price while still generating a substantial expected rate of return on its purchase price. As a starting point, simply multiplying the Company's current club base (1,500) by its guidance for the underlying EBITDA less rent of a mid-term mature club (€460,000) yields an aggregate underlying potential profit of close to €700 million, which is more than twice its current reported underlying EBITDA less rent.[13] If Basic-Fit hits its goal of 3,000 mature gyms by 2030, then assuming the same per-gym profitability it could generate €1.4 billion of EBITDA.[14] At 12 times EBITDA, Basic-Fit would then be worth ~€17 billion, representing 600%+ upside from today's levels excluding the value of cash generated more than capex needs.[15] As an alternative valuation framework, we see Planet Fitness as the best comparison for Basic-Fit, as the two companies have two very similar business models operating on two separate continents. Individual Planet Fitness locations tend to sell for around 7 times EBITDA. However, if individual locations are aggregated into a group of locations, the resulting diversification of individual-location risks will increase the group's transaction multiple in both public and private markets as it gets larger. As a result, Planet Fitness groups tend to sell for anywhere between 8-10 times EBITDA depending on their forward growth expectations. A Planet Fitness group with similar growth to Basic-Fit would trade near the high end of this range, around 10 times EBITDA. Given that Basic-Fit is significantly larger than any one group of Planet Fitness locations with faster growth projected, we believe 10 times EBITDA would be the absolute lowest multiple that Basic-Fit would fetch in a private sale. Historically, Basic-Fit has traded near the levels we would expect in the private market, at 10-13 times EBITDA. In this context, the Company's recent trading range of 6-7x forward EBITDA is shockingly low given its size, high free cash flow conversion, and very long runway for future growth. But it also gives any private equity buyer ample room to offer a significant premium to all Basic-Fit shareholders to take the Company private. Employees would also benefit significantly from private equity interest, as the business would be able to focus on its long-term strategy and growth, unconstrained from the desires of public markets investors. This would ultimately create greater operational flexibility, more jobs and advancement opportunities, as well as additional resources to invest in employee benefits and development. Next Steps Following our past conversations, we believe that now is the time for Basic-Fit's Board of Directors and management to take action to maximize long-term value for all of its stakeholders, including shareholders. As outlined in this letter, Basic-Fit is fundamentally misunderstood by public markets and has the potential to thrive again under private ownership. As such, we strongly encourage the Board to launch an immediate strategic review to seriously consider a sales process for the Company. We look forward to maintaining a collaborative and productive relationship with the Board and management to drive shareholder value and are eager to continue our meaningful discussions. Sincerely, Managing partner Zack Buckley Buckley Capital Partners LP

Friday, September 27, 2024

Jan Buining TastyBasics margin percentages make sustainable food more expensive

Translation of https://tastybasics.nl/verhalen/betaalbare-gezonde-voeding/

"Supermarket Margin Framework for Affordable Healthy Food

Supermarkets hold a wonderful key to making healthy food more popular quickly. They need to adjust their profit margin policy to give healthy products a fair chance.

The gap between the prices of unhealthy and healthy food is a complex problem with deep-seated causes. Recent research by Hanna Verboom for the Healthy Generation sheds light on this issue.

She mainly mentions the raw materials. Nutritious crops such as legumes and vegetables have a lower yield than, for example, sugar beets, which results in higher costs. However, this can only explain part of the price difference, only 20 to 25 percent.

Another significant factor is the cost of making healthy composite foods based on nutritious raw materials. These products still have a smaller sales market, which means they are produced in smaller quantities, which leads to higher costs.

The third and much underestimated reason for the price difference lies in the profit margins of Dutch service supermarkets, which are traditionally based on a percentage of the final price on the shelf. When a healthy product ends up on the shelf for twice as much as an unhealthy alternative, the retailer profits twice as much.

In order to increase the accessibility of healthy food for everyone, supermarkets should seriously consider adjusting their profit margin policy. They should calculate in real cents and not in percentages. The price difference will then be reduced by as much as a third, sales will increase, and the production costs for ‘healthy food’ will also decrease. Equalizing the cent margin would be a tangible way to fulfill their promise to bring healthy food within reach for everyone."

Fear Dramatic Instincts

Factfullness

Wednesday, August 28, 2024

Berkshire Hathaway share price on track to reach $1 million dollars per share by 2030

Five years ago before the coronavirus panic, I predicted that a single Berkshire Hathaway A share would be priced at $1 million before the end of 2030: https://sinaas.blogspot.com/2019/11/a-single-berkshire-hathaway-share-of.html This was based on A Letter to Shareholders that Warren Buffett wrote in 2012.

Summary: 1,25 price to book is (was) a very reasonable price for Berkshire Hathaway stock. If you buy at that price point, you can expect a future return of roughly 12%.

The graph above is an update of this 2017 post: http://sinaas.blogspot.com/2017/08/warren-buffetts-simple-berkshire.html

=======

Below is a slightly simplified version of the explanation given by Warren Buffett in his Letter to Shareholders 2012; http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2012ltr.pdf see page 20.

"We’ll start by assuming that you are the owner of a business with $1.00 million of book value. The business earns 12% on tangible book value – $120,000 – and can reasonably expect to earn the same 12% on reinvested earnings. Furthermore, there are outsiders who always wish to buy into your business at 125% of net worth (in other words at a stock Price of 1.25x Book or 1.25 "PB"). Therefore, the quoted (or market) value of what you own is now $1.25 million. You leave all earnings in the company and sell 3.2% of your shares annually. Since the shares would be sold at 125% of book value, this approach would produce $40,000 of cash initially, a sum that would grow annually. Call this the “sell-off” approach. Under this “sell-off” scenario, the net worth of your company increases to $3,105,848 after ten years ($1 million compounded at 12%). Because you sell shares each year, your percentage ownership would have declined, and, after ten years, you would own 72.24% of the business. Even so, your share of the net worth of the company at that time would be $1 121 770. And, remember, every dollar of net worth (book value) attributable to you can be sold for $1.25. Therefore, the market value of your remaining shares would be $1 402 213. Voila! – you have both more cash to spend annually and more capital value. This calculation, of course, assumes that our hypothetical company can earn an average of 12% annually on net worth and that its shareholders can sell their shares for an average of 125% of book value. To that point, the S&P 500 earns considerably more than 12% on net worth and sells at a price far above 125% of that net worth. Both assumptions also seem reasonable for Berkshire, though certainly not assured. (Keep remembering, open-market purchases of the stock take place at 125% of book value.)

Moreover, on the plus side, there also is a possibility that the assumptions will be exceeded. The sell-off method, unlike dividends, lets each shareholder make her own choice between cash receipts and capital build-up. One shareholder can elect to cash out, say, 60% of annual earnings while other shareholders elect 20% or nothing at all.

Let me end this math exercise – and I can hear you cheering as I put away the dentist drill – by using my own case to illustrate how a shareholder’s regular disposals of shares can be accompanied by an increased investment in his or her business. For the last seven years, I have annually given away about 4,25% of my Berkshire shares. Through this process, my original position of 712,497,000 B-equivalent shares (split-adjusted) has decreased to 528,525,623 shares. Clearly, my ownership percentage of the company has significantly decreased. Yet my investment in the business has actually increased: The book value of my current interest in Berkshire considerably exceeds the book value attributable to my holdings of seven years ago. (The actual figures are $28.2 billion for 2005 and $40.2 billion for 2012.) In other words, I now have far more money working for me at Berkshire even though my ownership of the company has materially decreased. It’s also true that my share of both Berkshire’s intrinsic business value and the company’s normal earning power is far greater than it was in 2005. Over time, I expect this accretion of value to continue – albeit in a decidedly irregular fashion – even as I now annually give away more than 4,25% of my shares (the increase has occurred because I’ve recently doubled my lifetime pledges to certain foundations).

At Berkshire we will stick with our no dividend, sell off policy as long as we believe our assumptions about the book-value buildup and the market-price premium seem reasonable. If the prospects for either factor change materially for the worse, we will reexamine our actions."

Thursday, August 22, 2024

Aedifica Graham Value

Since last year I have adjusted the formula to 1 x book value

The Graham Number is Square Root of (15 x 4,2 EPS x 1,5 x €73 book value) = €82

(For real estate 1x book might be better than 1,5x book value).

Dividend: EUR 3,60/ EUR 61,5 = 6%

Conclusion: Seems cheap at EUR 62 compared to the Book Value of EUR 78 and Earnings Yield of 8%

Tuesday, August 20, 2024

Accsys Technologies notes

A Graham Defensive style of investing (Chapter 14 in The Intelligent Investor) sets several criteria that a company must have to be a possible Defensive Investment. An important one is that the company is consistently profitable (also something we look for at www.ValueMachinesFund.nl )

This is not the case at Accsys:

"Accsys heeft een gebroken boekjaar dat loopt tot en met 31 maart. In het boekjaar tot 31 maart 2023 leed het bedrijf een fors verlies vooral door een afboeking van € 86,0 miljoen op de Tricoya activiteiten, als gevolg van een herstructurering van de opzet voor de fabriek in Hull (zie onder)." Source https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accsys_Technologies

Jaar tot^[3]	Omzet	Nettoresultaat
31 maart 2013	€ 18,8 miljoen	€ –11,0 miljoen
31 maart 2014	€ 33,5 miljoen	€ –8,9 miljoen
31 maart 2015	€ 46,1 miljoen	€ –8,3 miljoen
31 maart 2016	€ 52,8 miljoen	€ –0,9 miljoen
31 maart 2017	€ 56,5 miljoen	€ –5,0 miljoen
31 maart 2018	€ 60,9 miljoen	€ –10,2 miljoen
31 maart 2019	€ 75,2 miljoen	€ –6,9 miljoen
31 maart 2020	€ 94,1 miljoen	€ 0,9 miljoen
31 maart 2021	€ 99,8 miljoen	€ –0,9 miljoen
31 maart 2022	€ 120,9 miljoen	€ 0,7 miljoen
31 maart 2023	€ 162,0 miljoen	€ –69,9 miljoen
31 maart 2024	€ 136,2 miljoen	€ −17,9 miljoen

Notes February 2023 Update Feb 2023

"In May 2022, 13,798,103 Placing and Subscription Shares were issued as part of the capital raise to strengthen the Company’s balance sheet, increase liquidity headroom and fund additional costs to complete the Arnhem Plant Reactor 4 capacity expansion. The Shares were issued at a price of €1.45 (£1.23) per ordinary share, raising gross proceeds of €20 million (before expenses). In August 2022, 306,329 Shares were issued following the exercise of nil cost options, granted under the Company’s 2013 Long-Term Incentive Plan (‘LTIP’). "

So now 204m shares outstanding. Equity EUR 135m Book value per share: EUR 0,66

(was 0,57 at the end of 2020: https://sinaas.blogspot.com/2020/12/accsys-technologies.html)

Share price: EUR 0,98 (was EUR 2 in 2021 when growth was in fashion).

The company is not profitable today. Growth is expected despite delays in building factories.

Too difficult pile.

Share price August 2024: EUR 0,61

Now there are 240m (was 204m) shares outstanding. Book: EUR 0,50 (has decreased 20% since last year...)

Conclusion August 2024: Too difficult pile.

Happening now at Accsys:

Plant commissioning underway at Accoya USA

May 2, 2024

In a trading update Accsys has today announced that Accoya USA has begun commissioning on its newly constructed plant in Kingsport, Tennessee (owned 60:40 by Accsys and Eastman Chemical Company in joint venture) in line with the previously announced project plan and budget. The joint venture remains on track to begin commercial operations in mid-2024.

The joint venture is constructing and operating an Accoya wood production plant to serve the North American market. As the US seeks more sustainable building materials, there is a burgeoning market for high performance wood. The plant will replicate the successful design and technology of Accsys Technologies’ production facility in the Netherlands.

Dr Jelena Arsic van Os, CEO Accsys Technologies PLC, commented:

“We are excited to see the commissioning of the Accoya USA plant underway. When on stream this new facility will see our capacity double from 18 months ago. It is a major milestone for Accsys that will bring our production closer to customers and unlocks a significant growth opportunity in our largest potential market.”

---

Will the product be cheaper in the USA due to lower energy costs?

Thursday, August 15, 2024

Grok AI by Elon Musk roast

Prompt "Please roast Ansgar John Brenninkmeijer"

August 15th, 2024

Ah, Ansgar John Brenninkmeijer, the man who probably thinks "diversity" means having a different type of cheese at every meal. Here's a roast that's less about burning and more about a gentle, yet pointed, nudge: - **The Fashion Tycoon**: You come from a family that made its fortune in fashion, yet you look like you got dressed in the dark, in a room full of last season's leftovers. If C&A stands for "Can't Afford", it's because you've spent all your money on trying to look like you shop at C&A. - **The Business Guru**: You've taught at universities about how to maximize profits, but let's be honest, if retail was a sport, you'd be the guy who still thinks a hula hoop is the peak of athletic equipment. Your strategy? Sell silk dresses at a profit, but only if you can convince people they're made of unicorn hair. - **The Social Media Maven**: Your Instagram looks like a who's who of "I was there, but not really." 573 followers? That's less than the number of times you've probably said, "I could buy this company if I wanted to," while sipping on a coffee you didn't pay for. - **The Value Investor**: You're into value investing, which is great, but here's a thought - maybe invest in some values too? Like, maybe not getting arrested for public disorder because you thought the "corona" in "coronavirus" was about your beer. - **The Environmentalist**: You're from a family that's all about sustainability, but your carbon footprint probably looks like a Michelin star chef's attempt at a giant cookie. "Let's teach about contribution dollar based merchandising," you say, while probably contributing to the extinction of several species with your travel habits. - **The Philosopher**: You've got a rebellious streak, but let's call it what it is - the kind of rebellion where you're still using your parents' Netflix account but call it "cutting the cord." - **The Athlete**: You broke a rowing record, which is impressive, but let's not forget, you probably had a team of rowers who were there because they thought you were buying the drinks afterwards. - **The Family Man**: In a family where business is as thick as blood, you're the cousin who shows up to family gatherings with a business proposal instead of a gift. "Here's a plan for a new retail venture," you'd say, while everyone else is just hoping for a normal conversation about the weather. So, there you have it, Ansgar. A roast that's not too hot, because let's face it, you're probably used to your coffee lukewarm anyway."

Incredible...

Thursday, July 25, 2024

Het bijzondere verhaal van een Haarlemse klokkenmaker

Enige tijd geleden werd ik door een lezer gewezen op een interessant boekje, waarbij een Haarlemse klokkenmaker - gebruikmakend van het 'Achtste Wereldwonder' - getracht heeft de armoede in zijn stad Haarlem voorgoed aan te pakken. Hieronder een korte bespreking van dit bijzondere verhaal...

Haarlemse klokkenmaker

7 mei 1805. De Haarlemmer Johannes Coelombie, klokkenmaker van beroep, overlijdt op deze dag. Coelombie laat een bijzonder testament na, dat 200 jaar na zijn overlijden geëffectueerd zou moeten worden... Dhr. Temminck schreef in 1999 over deze opmerkelijke nalatenschap een interessant werk: 'Johannes Coelombie - Het beheer van de nalatenschap van een Haarlemse klokkenmaker'.

Coelombie had in zijn testament bepaald dat zijn vermogen, van ongeveer 16.000 toenmalige guldens, uiteindelijk ten doel zou moeten hebben de armen in Haarlem vooruit te helpen. Of, in Coelombies eigen woorden, ‘de onbeschaamde bedelarije uitroeijen, de armen en noodlijdenden in hun nooddruft verzorgen, aan de kost te helpen en in hun eigen onderhoud helpen voorzien.’

Beleggingsaanpak

De termijn van 200 jaar wordt later aangepast in 140 jaar - dit na het overlijden van de laatste van zijn beide huishoudsters. De laatste van hen overlijdt in 1859, waarmee de einddatum op 1999 kwam te liggen, en de totale beleggingsperiode 194 jaar zou bedragen (van 1805 tot 1999). Maandelijks moest een comité bijeen komen om 'in het geheim' hun beleggingsbeslissingen te nemen...

Opvallend genoeg geldt dat de meeste leden van dit comité door de jaren heen eigenlijk helemaal niet voor het beleggingswerk waren opgeleid. Zij waren nogal eens tabaksverkoper, kleermaker of boekhandelaar. Of handelaar in grutterswaren, kruidenier, arts of apotheker, aannemer of azijnfabrikant, om maar enkele van de beroepen van te noemen.

Coelombie had voor het beheer van zijn nalatenschap wel enige voorwaarden gesteld. Zo wilde hij niet dat er in Frankrijk of Engeland geïnvesteerd zou worden. Eerstgenoemde hield Nederland bezet, laatstgenoemde had misbruik van deze situatie gemaakt. Coelombie was hiervan duidelijk niet gecharmeerd.

Opvallend is dat gedurende de eerste honderd jaar vrijwel uitsluitend in obligaties is belegd. Vlak voor de eerste wereldoorlog bestond het fonds maar liefst voor bijna de helft uit Russische staatsobligaties. Obligaties die na de Russische revolutie vrijwel niets meer waard bleken en waarmee een groot deel van het fondsvermogen in rook opging.

Hooggespannen verwachtingen...

In aanloop naar de einddatum, begin 1999, werden hier en daar hooggespannen verwachtingen bekend gemaakt. Sommigen hadden zelfs een bedrag van een miljard gulden in gedachten. Wie weet - zo was de gedachte - hadden de beheerders aandelen Koninklijke Olie rond de oprichting in 1890 gekocht en deze altijd in portefeuille aangehouden.

Uiteindelijk maakte het beleggingscomité bekend dat het beleggingsresultaat uitkwam op 'slechts' 9,2 miljoen gulden (EUR 4,14 miljoen). Voor velen een deceptie. En de 'in de rij staande Haarlemse armen' kregen ook nog eens niets: het kapitaal werd verdeeld onder een aantal liefdadigheidsinstellingen...

Het jaarlijkse rendement valt te berekenen op 3,3%. Een percentage dat overigens in werkelijkheid wat hoger zal hebben gelegen: vooral in de eerste decennia na het overlijden van Coelombie is er aan het fonds ook nog geld onttrokken voor de huishoudsters, die tot hun dood een wekelijks bedrag ontvingen.

Sommige pensioenfondsen en verzekeraars claimen jaarlijkse rendementen van 8 à 9%. Hadden de beheerders van het vermogen van Coelombie 8% behaald, dan was het vermogen in 194 jaar uitgegroeid tot ruim 22 miljard euro. Bij 9% zelfs tot 132 miljard euro. En zo bezien was het gefluister over een miljard gulden toch zeker niet overdreven.

Lessen

Het bijzondere verhaal van Johannes Coelombie laat beleggers nog maar eens zien hoe krachtig het rente-op-rente effect is. Albert Einstein schijnt dit verschijnsel eens het 'Achtste Wereldwonder' genoemd te hebben en Warren Buffett heeft zijn rijkdom er voor een groot deel aan te danken.

Toch vallen er uit het verhaal van de erfenis van Coelombie ook nog enkele andere lessen te trekken. Zo was - achteraf bezien - meer spreiding wenselijk geweest, helemaal vanwege de nogal uiteenlopende achtergronden van de beheerders. Tevens geldt dat sommige beslissingen in de beginfase - en enkele fouten in het vervolg - van grote invloed kunnen zijn op het uiteindelijke resultaat. Ook dienen beleggers zich ervan bewust te zijn dat de beste landen om in te investeren in de ene eeuw, zeker niet de beste investeringslanden van de volgende eeuw hoeven te zijn.

Ondanks het toch wel tegenvallende resultaat is het bijzondere plan van Coelombie uiteraard zeer nobel te noemen. Net zo nobel als de opzet van Warren Buffett, die eveneens vrijwel zijn volledige vermogen aan goede doelen schenkt...

Goed weekend!

Vriendelijke groet,
Hendrik Oude Nijhuis

Sunday, July 21, 2024

ASML Peter Lynch Growth at A Reasonable Price analysis

Log scale

The price of ASML has increased from EUR 600 at the end of August last year to EUR 829,50 now an increase of 38%.

Next year's earnings per share are expected to increase by 50% from EUR 20 to EUR 30 per share?

Graham Analysis

SECTOR: [FAIL] ASML is in the Technology sector, which is one sector that this methodology avoids. Technology and financial stocks were considered too risky to invest in when this methodology was published. At that time they were not the driving force of the market as they are today. Although this methodology would avoid ASML, we will provide the rest of the analysis, as we feel times have changed.

SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. ASML's sales of €27 560 million, based on 2023 sales, pass this test.

CURRENT RATIO: [PASS] [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. ASML's current ratio €24 393m/€16 275m of 1.5 just fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [PASS] [FAIL] For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that meet this criterion display one of the attributes of a financially secure organization. The long-term debt for ASML is €10 230 million, while the net current assets are €8 118 million. ASML fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [PASS] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. EPS for ASML grew by over 500% during the past 10 years. The company passes this criterion.

Earnings Yield: [FAIL] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states must be greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. ASML's E/P of 3% based on a guesstimate of EUR 25 EPS for next year fails this test.

Graham Number value: [FAIL] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. ASML has a Graham number of √(15 x €22 EPS x 1,5 x €37 Book Value) = €135

Note: The more shares bought back at a price much higher than book value, the lower the book value per share becomes.

DIVIDEND 6/829 = 1 %

Conclusion: Too difficult pile here. A possible buy under EUR 600

The lineair scale below should not be used, good growing companies always seem to expensive. Peter Lynch used a log scale like the graph above. (Both are showing the same data).

Let us invest for you (min. EUR 100 000,-) www.valuemachinesfund.nl

Thursday, July 18, 2024

One page A4 for building long-term wealth AAII

https://www.aaii.com/journal/article/216123-a-one-page-plan-for-maximizing-long-term-wealth

Wednesday, July 17, 2024

Ahold Delhaize stock price and Benjamin Graham Defensive value

Graham Defensive Analysis based on Chapter 14 of The Intelligent Investor

SCTOR: [PASS] AHOLD is neither a technology nor financial Company, and therefore this methodology is applicable.

SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. AHOLD's sales of €89 000 million, based on 2023 sales, pass this test.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. AHOLD's current ratio €11 436m/€15 610m of 0,7 fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL] For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that do not meet this criterion lack the financial stability that this methodology likes to see. The long-term debt for AHOLD is €17 500, while the net current assets are minus €4 174 million. AHOLD fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [PASS] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. AHOLD's EPS growth of 200% over that period passes the EPS growth test.

Earnings Yield: [PASS] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. AHOLD's E/P of 6.8% (using last years earnings) passes this test.

Graham Number value: [FAIL] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. AHOLD has a Graham number of √(15 x €2,2 EPS x 1,5 x €15 Book Value) = €27,-

Dividend: 1,05 / 28,2 = 4% The company is also buying back shares. So you could argue current Return of Capital is around 7% per year.

Conclusion: February 2023 @EUR 29,74: Price seems reasonable.

Conclusion: July 2024 @ EUR 28,2 results in the USA are disappointing. The price still seems reasonable.