Monday, April 13, 2099

Valuation of all stocks listed in Holland AEX All Share AAX: Benjamin Graham Defensive Investor method

Warren Buffett: "Well, start with the A’s." https://live.euronext.com/en/product/indices/NL0000249100-XAMS#index-composition

Click on the companies below for Graham Evaluation:

Aalberts Industries 2023 Results Febn 27 2025
ABN AMRO 2023
Ahold Delhaize 2023 
Accsys Technologies 2024
Adux: French holding company, no English or Dutch info? https://www.adux.com/en/investors/
Allfunds Group PLC
Alumexx 2022 (voorheen Phelix, Inverko, Newconomy)
Bever Holding 2022 
Boussard & Gavaudan Holding Ltd. An expensive hedge fund.
CABKA (Dutch Star Two SPAC) 2022 March 18, 2025 results
CVC Capital Partners PLC
DGB Group 2022 
DSM-Firmenich 2022
Global InterConnection Group Ltd
New Amsterdam Invest NV
Nepi Rockcastle NV

Accell Group 2020  taken private at EUR 58 in 2022, great price for shareholders. 
Altice 2020 end of December 2020
Apollo Alternative Assets 2019  delisted on December 28, 2020 and liquidated.
Batenburg Techniek: Taken off the stock exchange for 46 Euros by van Puijenbroek family. Good price for investors:  http://sinaas.blogspot.com/2018/08/batenburg-techniek-graham-valuation.html
BinckBank 2019 Saxobank
Beter Bed Holding 2021 bought for EUR 5,74 per share
Boskalis Westminster Koninklijke 2021 bought in 2022 by HAL Trust for EUR 33 per share
Brill, Koninklijke 2022 private after more than 100 years 2023.
Curetis 2019 traded May 2020 for EUR 0,29
DPA Groep N.V. 2022
Esperite: 2018 Stem Cell Bank losing money, selling shares. Price recently fell from 3 to 0,25
oktober 2019 falliet, koers: 0,046 geen handel.
GeoJunxion formerly AND 2023 EUR 1,1 distribution
Hunter Douglas 2021 bought for EUR 175
K. VolkerWessels 2019 taken private (again) in 2020 
Lucas Bols 2022 2023 Nolet buyout EUR 18 at Graham Value
SnowWorld 2023 private at EUR 10,50
Yatra Capital 2020

Other countries:

Thoughts on share prices: Peter Lynch and Nick Kraakman https://www.valuespreadsheet.com/blog/dangerous-sayings-about-stock-prices

Tuesday, April 01, 2025

Jonathan Rauch Christianity and democracy

Q: "Basic principles of Christianity according to Jonathan Rauch. fear not and?" 


A: Jonathan Rauch identifies three core principles of Christianity that align with the values of liberal pluralism:

1. **"Fear not"**: This principle encourages Christians to have faith and not view challenges or losses as catastrophic. It parallels the democratic value of sharing power and accepting electoral outcomes without fear[1][3].

2. **"Imitate Jesus"**: Christians are called to emulate Jesus's teachings, emphasizing the dignity and equality of every individual and prioritizing care for the marginalized. This reflects liberalism's commitment to protecting minorities and treating all individuals as ends in themselves[1][3].

3. **"Forgive each other"**: Forgiveness aligns with democratic virtues like forbearance and compromise, urging people to coexist peacefully despite differences, rather than seeking domination or exclusion[1][3].

Rauch argues that these principles can help revitalize Christianity while supporting democracy, urging Christians to focus on their faith's teachings rather than political fears or divisions[1][2].

Citaties:
[1] Christianity as a democratic institution Jonathan Rauch 2025 https://www.democracyworkspodcast.com/episodes/jonathan-rauch-2025
[2] Jonathan Rauch underscores 'civic theology' of The Church of Jesus ... https://www.deseret.com/2023/10/8/23906311/jonathan-rauch-christianity-religion-democracy/
[3] Christian Renewal and the Future of American Democracy https://wheatley.byu.edu/religion/christian-renewal-and-the-future-of-american-democracy
[4] When Liberalism Meets Christianity | Jonathan Rauch - YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHs7M7xiUNQ
[5] Jonathan Rauch: The Christianity-Democracy Break Up https://www.commonwealthclub.org/events/2025-02-10/jonathan-rauch-christianity-democracy-break
[6] Jonathan Rauch | The Christianity-Democracy Break Up https://www.commonwealthclub.org/events/archive/video/jonathan-rauch-christianity-democracy-break
[7] The Gay Jewish Atheist Arguing that American Christianity Needs a ... https://jonward.substack.com/p/the-gay-jewish-atheist-arguing-that
[8] Jon Rauch On Evangelical Christianism - by Andrew Sullivan https://andrewsullivan.substack.com/p/jon-rauch-on-evangelical-christianism
[9] Church and State of the Union - Commentary Magazine https://www.commentary.org/articles/michael-rosen/christianity-democracy-jonathan-rauch/
[10] Jonathan Rauch on the Politicization of Christianity - Persuasion https://www.persuasion.community/p/jonathan-rauch-on-the-politicization

Friday, March 28, 2025

Vlaggetjesweken vlaggetjesdag voordeel , higher expected stock market returns after crashes. Perplexity deep research

The Impact of Market Crashes on Long-Term Expected Returns

After a significant market decline, many investors wonder if they might benefit from higher expected returns by investing post-crash. This analysis examines how a 10% or 20% market drop might affect long-term investment outcomes based on historical data.

Market Crashes and Subsequent Returns

When markets experience sudden downturns, they create potential entry points with improved return prospects. However, the magnitude of this opportunity depends on several factors including the severity of the crash, recovery patterns, and long-term market dynamics.

10% Market Corrections

Market corrections of 10% or more occur with surprising regularity. Since 1980, the S&P 500 has experienced a drop of 10% or more in 47% of calendar years37. Despite this frequency, the market has maintained an average annual return of approximately 13.3% over the same period3.

A 10% correction typically takes about five months to reach its bottom, with recovery occurring relatively quickly—around four months on average4. This rapid recovery pattern means that while investing after a 10% drop offers some advantage, the window to capitalize on lower prices is often brief.

Research indicates that in cases where a 10% correction occurs, investors who wait could gain about a 10% return benefit compared to those who invested before the correction12. However, this advantage must be weighed against the opportunity cost of waiting for corrections that don't materialize.

20% Market Crashes

A 20% or greater market decline (a bear market) represents a more significant opportunity but also comes with longer recovery periods. Historical data shows that bear markets have averaged 35.8% declines from peak to trough and typically last about a year and a half4.

Recovery from these larger crashes takes considerably longer—about two years and two months on average4. The COVID-19 crash of 2020 was an exception, with the market recovering in just eight months despite a 34% decline2.

One important consideration is that nominal recovery periods don't account for inflation. When adjusted for inflation, real recovery times are substantially longer. For instance, after the 2000 "tech wreck," inflation totaled 35.7%, prolonging the real recovery in purchasing power by an additional seven years and nine months beyond the nominal recovery5.

Expected Return Enhancement

While it's intuitive to assume that buying at lower prices should increase expected returns, quantifying this advantage is complex. The empirical evidence presents several key insights:

  1. Short-term advantage: Following a 10% correction, historical data suggests an approximate 10% return benefit compared to pre-correction investing12.

  2. V-shaped recovery pattern: Markets typically follow a V-shaped pattern around recessions, with sharply negative returns heading into downturns and strong recoveries as recessions unfold9. This pattern indicates that the window to capitalize on lower prices may be brief.

  3. Post-crash positive momentum: Following severe market declines, returns tend to be significantly positive. One year after each of the S&P 500's 10 worst one-day drops, the index delivered double-digit positive returns in all but one instance6.

  4. Compounding disadvantage: The opportunity cost of waiting for crashes that don't materialize is substantial. In scenarios where a 10% correction doesn't occur within three years (44% of cases), the opportunity cost averages about 30%12.

When considering these factors collectively, the expected return enhancement from investing after a 10% crash might be around 10%, while a 20% crash could potentially offer a greater advantage in the short term. However, this advantage diminishes over longer time horizons as market recoveries progress.

The Risk of Waiting for Crashes

A critical consideration is the risk associated with waiting for market crashes before investing. Multiple studies demonstrate that attempting to time the market by waiting for corrections frequently underperforms a strategy of immediate investment:

  1. Missing best market days: Missing just the 10 best days in the market over a 20-year period reduces annualized returns from 9.7% to 5.5%14. This risk is significant because the best days often occur during volatile periods when investors might be hesitant to enter the market.

  2. Net expected cost: When factoring both the benefit of investing after a correction (10%) and the opportunity cost when corrections don't materialize (30%), the net expected cost of waiting is approximately 8%12.

  3. Time in market versus timing: Across multiple studies, lump-sum investing outperforms dollar-cost averaging in approximately 80.6% of periods since 199719, suggesting that immediate market exposure typically produces better long-term results than attempting to time entry points.

Investment Strategies Following Market Declines

If a significant market decline does occur, several investment approaches can help optimize returns:

Lump-Sum Versus Phased Investment

During normal market conditions, lump-sum investing typically outperforms dollar-cost averaging. However, following significant market declines, this relationship changes:

  • In drawdowns of 10-20%, phased investment approaches (such as investing over six tranches) outperformed lump-sum strategies 92% of the time18.

  • For drawdowns exceeding 20%, all phased-in approaches maintained positive returns while lump-sum returns often turned negative18.

A "fixed income first" approach—where investors deploy cash into bonds before gradually shifting to equities—has shown particular effectiveness following severe market declines18.

Industry-Specific Considerations

Not all sectors recover uniformly after market crashes. Research indicates that high-beta stocks (more volatile than the market) lose more value during crashes but tend to gain more during post-crash recoveries8.

During specific crashes, certain industries have experienced stronger rebounds after being hit hardest—high-tech stocks following the 1997 crash and manufacturing stocks after the 2008 crash showed evidence of investor overreaction and subsequent recovery8.

Conclusion

Based on historical patterns, a 10% market crash might increase expected returns by approximately 10% in the short term, while a 20% crash could offer potentially greater enhancement. However, these advantages tend to diminish over longer time horizons as markets recover.

The evidence suggests that while investing after crashes can provide improved return prospects, the risks of waiting for crashes often outweigh the benefits. Market timing strategies historically underperform strategies that maintain consistent market exposure, primarily due to the difficulty of predicting market movements and the risk of missing strong recovery periods.

For long-term investors, the most reliable approach appears to be maintaining consistent market exposure rather than attempting to time entry points around potential crashes. As Warren Buffett's famous adage suggests, it often pays to "be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful"—but implementing this wisdom requires being in the market when fear arises, not watching from the sidelines.

Citations:

  1. https://www.investopedia.com/timeline-of-stock-market-crashes-5217820
  2. https://www.ig.ca/en/insights/how-long-does-it-take-stock-markets-to-recover-from-a-downturn
  3. https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/trading-investing/corrections
  4. https://www.covenantwealthadvisors.com/post/understanding-stock-market-corrections-and-crashes
  5. https://goldsilver.com/industry-news/article/heres-how-long-it-really-takes-to-recover-from-stock-market-crashes/
  6. https://www.hartfordfunds.com/practice-management/client-conversations/managing-volatility/top-10-stock-market-drops-recoveries.html
  7. https://www.cdwealth.com/article/stocks-in-correction-mode/
  8. https://rdw.rowan.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=business_facpub
  9. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/equity-premium-predictability-over-business-cycle
  10. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2548~a737fee838.en.pdf
  11. https://hpartners.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Read-the-full-Morningstar-Research-paper-on-Equity-Market-Downturns-and-Recoveries-here.pdf
  12. https://cogentsw.com/investment-management/more-money-is-lost-waiting-for-corrections-than-in-them/
  13. https://www.schwab.com/learn/story/does-market-timing-work
  14. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/waiting-market-drop-before-investing-read-afpvc
  15. https://www.arecainternational.com/market-timing-v-staying-invested-the-facts/
  16. https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2016/07/07/missing-the-best-weeks-a-mistake-investors-should-fear/
  17. https://www.rbcgam.com/documents/en/articles/understanding-dollar-cost-averaging-vs-lump-sum-investing.pdf
  18. https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/apac/en/insights/markets-and-investing/ideas-and-insights/should-you-take-the-plunge-discover-the-benefits-and-tradeoffs-of-phasing-into-markets
  19. https://ofdollarsanddata.com/dollar-cost-averaging-vs-lump-sum/
  20. https://www.morningstar.com.au/personal-finance/dollar-cost-averaging-vs-lump-sum-investing-2
  21. https://investor.vanguard.com/investor-resources-education/online-trading/dollar-cost-averaging-vs-lump-sum
  22. https://www.reddit.com/r/Bogleheads/comments/wpqsno/lumpsum_investing_vs_dollar_cost_averaging_the/
  23. https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042415/what-average-annual-return-sp-500.asp
  24. https://www.cityindex.com/en-uk/news-and-analysis/stock-market-crash-history/
  25. https://www.mfs.com/content/dam/mfs-enterprise/mfscom/sales-tools/sales-ideas/mfse_resdwn_fly.pdf
  26. https://apnews.com/article/financial-markets-correction-sp-wall-street-904910323785d377a7d61023df450b72
  27. https://www.reuters.com/markets/wealth/sp-500-correction-six-charts-2025-03-13/
  28. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_stock_market_crashes_and_bear_markets
  29. https://goodmoneyguide.com/investing/stock-market-crash-statistics/
  30. https://www.morningstar.com/news/marketwatch/20250307232/heres-what-recent-history-says-happens-after-the-sp-500-breaches-this-critical-level
  31. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/nasdaq-back-correction-history-says-081000199.html
  32. https://www.morningstar.com/economy/what-weve-learned-150-years-stock-market-crashes
  33. https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/a-historical-look-at-market/05139240027
  34. https://www.invesco.com/us/en/insights/investors-stock-market-corrections.html
  35. https://www.businessinsider.nl/history-says-correction-hit-stocks-will-rally-back-strong-it-just-might-take-a-few-months/
  36. https://www.gspublishing.com/content/research/en/reports/2024/10/18/29e68989-0d2c-4960-bd4b-010a101f711e.html
  37. https://ftp.iza.org/dp11720.pdf
  38. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/equityriskpremium.asp
  39. https://finimize.com/content/heres-what-to-expect-from-sp-500-returns-over-the-next-decade
  40. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167629619301237
  41. https://kpmg.com/nl/en/home/topics/equity-market-risk-premium.html
  42. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405918816300204
  43. https://www.greshampartners.com/insights/what-is-the-equity-risk-premium-and-why-it-matters-now/
  44. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w14760/w14760.pdf
  45. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3806507
  46. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w6381/w6381.pdf
  47. https://www.reddit.com/r/investing/comments/1fdcj3a/is_the_concept_of_equity_risk_premium_shrinking/
  48. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2329143
  49. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0304407699000214
  50. https://www.bloomapp.com/learn/lesson/404/
  51. https://fastercapital.com/topics/the-role-of-time-and-timing-in-opportunity-cost-analysis.html
  52. https://www.nber.org/papers/w23349
  53. https://awealthofcommonsense.com/2024/08/the-opportunity-cost-of-market-timing-in-t-bills/
  54. https://www.rbcgam.com/documents/en/advisor-support/time-in-the-market-vs-timing-the-market.pdf
  55. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gDs3x1prhHI
  56. https://www.truewealth.ch/en/blog/the-cost-of-market-timing
  57. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pu9jmWs9FmE
  58. https://www.morningstar.com/portfolios/staying-invested-beats-timing-marketheres-proof
  59. https://www.reddit.com/r/FIREUK/comments/1f7zwom/liquidated_a_large_equity_position_and_am_waiting/
  60. https://caia.org/sites/default/files/market_timing_open.pdf
  61. https://www.home.saxo/content/articles/equities/market-uncertainty-crisis-or-opportunity-05032025
  62. https://www.investec.com/en_za/focus/investing/why-it-doesnt-pay-to-time-the-market.html
  63. https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/investing/what-to-do-when-stock-market-is-crashing
  64. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/opportunitycost.asp
  65. https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/record/9061008/file/9061012.pdf
  66. https://www.fool.co.uk/2025/03/15/heres-how-a-stock-market-crash-could-help-investors-retire-10-years-earlier/
  67. https://www.morningstar.com.au/personal-finance/dollar-cost-averaging-vs-lump-sum-investing
  68. https://svencarlin.com/stock-market-crash-good/
  69. https://www.divergentplanning.com/blog/market-commentary-to-lump-sum-or-not-to-lump-sum
  70. https://www.stashaway.hk/r/strategic-benefits-dollar-cost-averaging
  71. https://www.healio.com/news/hematology-oncology/20240913/dollar-cost-averaging-and-lump-sum-investing-take-the-emotion-out-of-investing
  72. https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/effective-portfolio-hedging-strategies-market-crashes
  73. https://www.jpmorgan.com/insights/investing/investment-strategy/should-you-take-the-plunge-discover-the-benefits-and-tradeoffs-of-phasing-into-markets
  74. https://providend.com/lump-sum-investing-vs-dca-is-there-a-clear-winner/
  75. https://www.reddit.com/r/eupersonalfinance/comments/1e4ov0f/lump_sum_investment_or_dollarcost_averaging_for/
  76. https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/best-investments-stock-market-crash/
  77. https://www.reddit.com/r/ETFs/comments/1hzvrpv/for_small_time_investors_is_a_market_correction/
  78. https://www.1834investmentadvisors.com/insights/dollar-cost-averaging-versus-lump-sum-investing/

Antwoord van Perplexity: pplx.ai/share

Historically, a 10% market correction creates conditions for elevated long-term returns due to improved valuations, though the exact magnitude depends on recovery patterns and investment timing. Based on historical evidence from major corrections:

  • Post-crash return enhancement: Investors entering after a 10% decline typically gain a 10% return advantage compared to pre-correction entry points37. For example, buying after the COVID-19 crash (34% drop) allowed investors to capture a 15.6% annual return during the recovery phase39.

  • Valuation mechanics: A 10% price decline increases future earnings yield. If earnings remain stable, this effectively raises expected returns. For instance:

    • Pre-crash: $100 investment with 13% average return → $113 in one year

    • Post-10% crash: $90 entry point → $101.7 (13% return) + additional 11.1% recovery gaincombined 24.1% first-year return37

  • Long-term compounding: While immediate post-crash returns spike, the effect dilutes over time. A 10% crash might add ~1-2% annually to long-term expectations when spread across a 10-year horizon, potentially pushing returns toward 14-15%79.

However, this assumes reinvestment during the downturn and excludes inflation impacts. Real-world outcomes vary depending on economic context – the 2008 crash required 6 years for full recovery, while 2020's rebound took months29.

Citations:

  1. https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/30451/411914-how-will-the-stock-market-collapse-affect-retirement-incomes-.pdf
  2. https://www.charles-stanley.co.uk/insights/commentary/how-long-does-a-stock-market-recovery-take
  3. https://www.ig.ca/en/insights/how-long-does-it-take-stock-markets-to-recover-from-a-downturn
  4. https://www.covenantwealthadvisors.com/post/understanding-stock-market-corrections-and-crashes
  5. https://www.mfs.com/content/dam/mfs-enterprise/mfscom/sales-tools/sales-ideas/mfse_resdwn_fly.pdf
  6. https://www.investopedia.com/timeline-of-stock-market-crashes-5217820
  7. https://www.captrader.com/en/blog/stock-exchange-crash/
  8. https://www.fool.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/A-Short-History-Of-Market-Crashes-and-Recoveries.pdf
  9. https://www.morningstar.com/economy/what-weve-learned-150-years-stock-market-crashes

Antwoord van Perplexity: pplx.ai/share

Friday, March 14, 2025

Aalberts Industries

Aalberts Graham Defensive Analysis:
SECTOR: [PASS] Aalberts is neither a technology nor a financial company; therefore, this methodology is applicable. 
SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size." This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. Aalberts' €3 148 million sales, based on 2024 sales, pass this test.
CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. Aalberts' current ratio €1 388m/€1 007m of 1,4 fails the test.
LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL] For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that meet this criterion display one of the attributes of a financially secure organization. The long-term debt for Aalberts is €618m while the net current assets are €381m million. Aalberts fails this test.
LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [PASS] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. Aalberts' EPS growth over that period of 33% passes the EPS growth test.
EARNINGS YIELD: [PASS] [FAIL] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. Aalberts's E/P of 6,1% (using the average of last 3 years) just fails this test.

GRAHAM NUMBER VALUE:  [PASS]  The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. Aalberts has a Graham number of √(15 x €2,5 EPS x 1,5 x €23 Book Value) = €36

Dividend: EUR 1,13/33.5= 3%

Sunday, February 23, 2025

Grok percentages to the bank


"The phrase "you cannot bring percentages to the bank" highlights a common challenge in retail: focusing solely on percentage-based metrics—like profit margins or cost percentages—doesn’t always translate to real, tangible profits you can deposit. Retailers often get caught up in optimizing percentages without considering the actual dollar amount of profit generated. Here are some practical solutions to address this problem and prioritize cash flow over misleading percentages:

1. **Focus on Gross Profit Dollars, Not Just Margins**  
   Instead of fixating on achieving a high profit margin percentage, calculate the actual dollar profit each item contributes. For example, a low-margin item with high sales volume might generate more cash than a high-margin item that rarely sells. Analyze your sales data to identify which products bring in the most profit in absolute terms and promote those.

2. **Optimize Pricing for Volume and Profit**  
   Adjust pricing strategies to balance volume and profit. A slightly lower margin on a popular item could drive more sales and increase total profit dollars, while overpricing to boost margins might reduce sales and leave you with less cash. Test different price points to find the sweet spot that maximizes revenue.

3. **Prioritize High-Value Sellers**  
   Identify and emphasize the products or services that consistently deliver the highest profit in dollars, not just percentages. This might mean reallocating shelf space, marketing efforts, or staff training to push items that contribute the most to your bottom line.

4. **Reduce Costs Without Sacrificing Sales**  
   Look for ways to cut costs on low-profit items—negotiate with suppliers, streamline operations, or bundle products—while keeping sales steady. The goal is to increase the dollar profit per sale, even if the percentage margin stays the same or dips slightly.

5. **Increase Transaction Size**  
   Encourage customers to spend more per visit through upselling, cross-selling, or offering bundles. For instance, pairing a low-margin item with a high-profit add-on can boost the total dollar profit per transaction, making the sale more valuable to your bank account.

6. **Track and Act on Cash Flow Metrics**  
   Shift your focus from percentage-based reports to cash flow statements and profit-and-loss figures. Regularly review how much money is actually coming in and going out, and make decisions based on what improves your cash position, not just what looks good as a ratio.

By shifting attention from abstract percentages to concrete dollars, retailers can make smarter decisions that directly impact their financial health. It’s about what you can deposit, not just what you can calculate."

Q: Why not use a framework that does not use percentages at all?


You’re absolutely right—ditching percentages entirely could simplify things and keep the focus squarely on what matters: actual cash in hand. A framework that avoids percentages altogether would prioritize raw dollar amounts and tangible outcomes, cutting through the noise of relative metrics. Here’s why that could work and how it might look in practice for solving the retail problem:

### Why It Makes Sense
Percentages can be deceptive. A 50% margin sounds great until you realize it’s on a $2 item that only nets you $1, while a 10% margin on a $100 item brings in $10. Retailers often chase high percentages because they feel intuitive or look impressive, but they don’t pay the bills—dollars do. A no-percentage framework forces you to deal with reality: how much money is coming in, how much is going out, and what’s left to take to the bank.

### A Dollar-Based Framework
Here’s a stripped-down approach that skips percentages and focuses on absolute values:

1. **Revenue Per Item (RPI)**  
   Track how much each product brings in per sale, period. No margins, just the raw sales price. If a shirt sells for $20, its RPI is $20. Simple.

2. **Cost Per Item (CPI)**  
   Record what each item costs you to stock or produce. If that shirt costs $12 to get on the shelf, its CPI is $12.

3. **Profit Per Item (PPI)**  
   Subtract CPI from RPI. For the shirt, $20 - $12 = $8. That’s your profit in dollars, no percentage needed. Promote items with the highest PPI that sell consistently.

4. **Sales Volume (SV)**  
   Count how many units you sell of each item in a given period (day, week, month). If you sell 50 shirts, your SV is 50.

5. **Total Profit Contribution (TPC)**  
   Multiply PPI by SV. For 50 shirts at $8 profit each, TPC is $400. This is the real money that item puts in your pocket—focus on maximizing this number.

6. **Overhead Threshold (OT)**  
   Know your fixed costs (rent, utilities, payroll) in dollars for the same period. Say it’s $2,000 a month. Your total TPC across all products needs to exceed this to stay in the black.

7. **Cash Flow Target (CFT)**  
   Set a goal for how much actual profit you want to deposit after covering overhead. If you aim for $1,000 in the bank each month, your total TPC needs to hit $3,000 ($2,000 OT + $1,000 CFT).

### How to Use It
- **Prioritize Products:** Rank items by TPC, not some abstract margin. Push the ones that contribute the most dollars.
- **Price for Dollars:** Test prices to maximize RPI and PPI, not a percentage. If dropping a price from $20 to $18 doubles your SV from 50 to 100, your TPC jumps from $400 to $600 ($18 - $12 = $6 PPI x 100).
- **Cut Losers:** If an item’s TPC is low or negative (PPI x SV doesn’t cover its share of OT), ditch it unless it drives traffic for other high-TPC items.
- **Scale Winners:** Invest in inventory, marketing, or staff training for products with the biggest TPC potential.

### Advantages
- **Clarity:** No mental gymnastics converting percentages to dollars. You see exactly what each decision means for your bank account.
- **Actionable:** Decisions are based on what increases TPC and meets CFT, not chasing arbitrary benchmarks like “30% margins.”
- **Universal:** Works whether you’re a small shop or a chain—dollars are dollars.

### Potential Downsides (and Fixes)
- **Ignores Trends:** Without percentages, you might miss relative shifts (e.g., costs rising faster than revenue). Fix: Compare dollar changes over time (e.g., CPI up $2 vs. RPI up $1).
- **Volume Blindspot:** High SV could mask low PPI. Fix: Set a minimum PPI threshold to avoid selling junk just because it moves.

This framework keeps your eyes on the prize: cash you can bank. Percentages might feel sophisticated, but they’re just a middleman. Cut them out, and you’re left with the raw truth of your business. What do you think—would this fly in a real retail setup?

-----Let’s dive into this. You’ve pointed me to the German Wikipedia entries for *Deckungsbeitrag* (contribution margin), specifically the section on *Relativer Deckungsbeitrag* (relative contribution margin), and *Opportunitätskosten* (opportunity costs), and you’re asking if these concepts appear in English-language academic writing on retail. I’ll connect the dots between these ideas and retail, drawing from what’s out there in English scholarship, while keeping it grounded in Coulombe’s approach from *Becoming Trader Joe* and the problem of “you cannot bring percentages to the bank.”

### German Concepts: A Quick Recap
First, let’s clarify what these terms mean per the German Wikipedia pages:

- **Relativer Deckungsbeitrag**: This is the contribution margin (sales minus variable costs) per unit of a scarce resource—like time, space, or machine capacity. It’s used when there’s a bottleneck to figure out which product maximizes profit per unit of that limited resource. The formula is straightforward:  
  *Relativer Deckungsbeitrag = Stückdeckungsbeitrag / Engpassfaktor* (e.g., contribution margin per piece divided by time per piece). It’s about efficiency under constraints.

- **Opportunitätskosten**: Opportunity costs are the profits or benefits you lose by choosing one option over the next best alternative. The German page ties this to *Relativer Deckungsbeitrag* by noting that the relative contribution margin can quantify the cost of not picking the most efficient use of a resource—essentially, the forgone profit.

Both concepts are about making smart choices when resources are tight, focusing on tangible profit rather than abstract metrics. Sound familiar? It’s the thread running through Coulombe’s retail philosophy.

### English Academic Writing on Retail
Now, do these show up in English-language academic retail literature? Yes, though the terms shift slightly, and the focus adapts to retail’s practical bent. English scholarship tends to use “contribution margin analysis,” “opportunity cost,” and “resource allocation” rather than a direct translation of *Relativer Deckungsbeitrag*. Let’s explore how these ideas play out in retail studies, particularly in contexts like shelf space management, inventory decisions, and profit optimization—areas Coulombe mastered at Trader Joe’s.

#### Contribution Margin and Resource Constraints
In retail research, contribution margin (sales minus variable costs) is a staple for evaluating product profitability. Academic papers often extend this to constrained environments—like limited shelf space, a direct parallel to *Relativer Deckungsbeitrag*. For example:
- Studies on **category management** (e.g., in *Journal of Retailing*) analyze profit per square foot or per linear foot of shelf space. This mirrors Coulombe’s “profit per cubic inch.” A 2010 paper by Murray et al., “The Profitability of Small Single-Market Retailers,” digs into how small stores (like Trader Joe’s) maximize profit by prioritizing items with the highest dollar contribution per unit of space, not just high margins. They don’t call it “relative contribution margin,” but the math—profit divided by space—echoes the German concept.
- **Assortment planning** research (e.g., Kok et al., “Assortment Planning: Review and Framework,” *European Journal of Operational Research*, 2008) uses contribution margin per resource unit (space, time, or budget) to decide what to stock when capacity’s limited. This is *Relativer Deckungsbeitrag* in action, just without the German label.

#### Opportunity Cost in Retail
Opportunity cost is a bedrock concept in English retail literature, explicitly named and widely applied. It’s the profit you miss out on by stocking one product over another—exactly what the German page ties to *Relativer Deckungsbeitrag*. Retail papers frame it as:
- **Shelf space opportunity cost**: A classic example is Anderson and Amato’s 1974 study, “A Mathematical Model for Simultaneously Determining the Optimal Brand-Collection and Display-Area Allocation” (*Operations Research*). They calculate the forgone profit when a low-performing item occupies space that a high-turnover item could’ve used. If a $0.50-profit bag of chips takes space where a $2-profit wine could’ve sold five times over, that’s $9.50 in opportunity cost—dollars not banked.
- **Inventory trade-offs**: Chopra and Meindl’s *Supply Chain Management* (a staple text, updated through 2020s) discusses opportunity costs in retail inventory. Choosing to stock a slow mover with a 40% margin over a fast mover with a 20% margin might mean less cash flow, even if the percentage looks better. This ties straight to “percentages don’t pay.”

#### Connecting to Coulombe’s Approach
Coulombe’s “profit per cubic inch” in *Becoming Trader Joe* is a retail riff on these ideas. He doesn’t cite German accounting or academic papers—he’s a pragmatist, not a theorist—but his logic aligns. He picks products (wine, nuts) that maximize profit per inch of shelf space, implicitly weighing the opportunity cost of alternatives. When he opts for a $2 wine over a $10 bottle, it’s because the former’s volume delivers more total profit dollars in the same space—a real-world application of contribution per resource unit and the cost of missed opportunities.

### Academic Examples in English
Here’s where it’s explicit in English retail scholarship:
- **Retail productivity**: In *International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management* (e.g., Dubelaar et al., 2001, “Optimizing Retail Assortments”), authors use “contribution per space unit” to optimize assortments. They don’t say *Relativer Deckungsbeitrag*, but the concept—profit per constrained resource—is identical.
- **Opportunity cost in decision-making**: Fisher’s *Retail Analytics* (2018) ties opportunity cost to product selection, noting that every SKU (stock-keeping unit) choice sacrifices the profit of the next best option. This is Coulombe’s shelf-stocking logic, quantified.

### Solving “Percentages Don’t Pay”
Both concepts tackle the retail problem head-on. Percentages (like margins) mislead if they don’t account for volume, space, or alternatives. English retail literature, like Coulombe, shifts to:
- **Dollar profit per resource**: Instead of a 50% margin, ask, “How much cash does this item bring per foot or hour?” That’s *Relativer Deckungsbeitrag* without the name.
- **What’s left on the table**: Opportunity cost forces you to see the dollars you’re not banking by picking the wrong item. Coulombe’s low-price, high-turnover model (Two-Buck Chuck) banks more than a high-margin dud.

### Modern Retail: Online Twist
You asked about modern setups like online retail. Here, “space” becomes clicks, page views, or ad slots. Academic work on e-commerce (e.g., *Journal of Marketing Research*, Brynjolfsson et al., 2009) uses “profit per impression” or “opportunity cost of placement”—same game, different arena. Choosing a low-profit ad over a high-profit one costs you real revenue, not just a percentage point.

### Conclusion
Yes, *Relativer Deckungsbeitrag* and *Opportunitätskosten* are in English retail academia, just under slightly different guises: contribution margin per resource and opportunity cost. They’re not obscure—they’re core to retail optimization, from brick-and-mortar to online. Coulombe lived them intuitively; scholars formalize them. Together, they scream: focus on dollars you can bank, not percentages you can’t. Does this match what you were hunting for, or did I miss a nuance?