Valuation of all stocks listed in Holland AEX All Share AAX: Benjamin Graham Defensive Investor method

Warren Buffett: "Well, start with the A’s." Click on the companies below for Graham Evaluation:

Aalberts Industries 2019
ABN AMRO 2019 
Accell Group 2019 
Ahold Delhaize Koninklijke 2019
Accsys Technologies 2019
Adyen 2019
Aedifica 2019
Aegon 2019
AFC AJAX 2019
Air France-KLM 2019 
Akzo Nobel 2019 
Alfen 2019
Altice 2019
Alumexx 2019 (voorheen Phelix, Inverko, Newconomy)
AMG Advanced Metallurgical Group NV 2019
Amsterdam Commodities ACOMO 2019
AND International Publishers 2019
Apollo Alternative Assets 2019 
Aperam 2019
Arcadis 2019
ArcelorMittal 2019 
ASM International 2019
ASML 2019
ASR Nederland 2019
Avantium 2019
BAM Koninklijke Groep 2019
Basic Fit 2019
BE Semiconductor AEX:BESI 2019
Beter Bed Holding 2019
B&S Group 2019

Berkshire Hathway 2019 run by Warren Buffett

Bever Holding 2019
Boskalis Westminster Koninklijke 2019
Boussard & Gavaudan Holding Ltd. An expensive hedge fund.
Brill, Koninklijke 2019
Brunel 2019
Coca-Cola European Partners 2019
Corbion 2019
Core Laboratories 2019
Ctac 2019
Curetis 2019
DGB Group 2019 check May 2020 
DPA Groep N.V. 2019
DSM Koninklijke 2019
Dutch Star One 2019
Ease2pay 2019
Envipco 2019
Eurocastle 2019
Eurocommercial Properties 2019
Euronext 2019
Fagron 2019
Fastned 2019
Flow Traders 2019 
FNG 2019
ForFarmers 2019
Fugro 2019
Galapagos 2019
GrandVision 2019 EUR 28 offer
HAL Trust 2019 buy at EUR 143
Heijmans 2019
Heineken 2019
Holland Colours 2019 buy under €100
Hunter Douglas 2019
Hydratec 2019
ICT Group NV 2019
IEX Group 2019 still losing money, not for the defensive investor
IMCD 2019
ING Bank 2019
Intertrust 2019
Kendrion 2019
Kiadis Pharma 2019
Klepierre cheap at €20? 2019
KPN 2019
K. Porceleyne Fles Koninklijke 2019
K. VOPAK 2019
K. Wessanen 2019 buy out?
K. VolkerWessels 2019
Lavide Holding 2019 
Lucas Bols 2019
Marel 2019
Nedap 2019
MKB Nedsense 2019
Morefield Group 2019 (voorheen Headfirst)
New Sources Energy 2020
Neways 2019
NIBC 2019

NN Group  2019
Novisource 2019
NSI Nieuwe Steen Investments HNK = Het Nieuwe Kantoor 2019
OCI 2019
Oranjewoud 2018   https://www.oranjewoudnv.nl/uitstel-publicatie-jaarverslag-2019-oranjewoud-n-v-2/  Check Juli 2020
Ordina 2019
Pershing Square 2019
Pharming 2019
Philips 2019
PostNL 2019
Randstad 2019
Retail Estates 2019
RELX 2019
RoodMicrotec 2019
Royal Dutch Shell 2019
SBM Offshore 2019
Sif Holding 2019
Signify Philips Lighting 2019
Sligro 2019
SnowWorld 2019
Stern Groep 2019 still a buy?
Takeaway.com 2018
Tetragon 2018
Thunderbird Resorts 2018
TIE Kinetix 2018
TKH Group 2018
TomTom 2018
Unibail Rodamco 2019 a buy?
Unilever 2018
Value8 2019
Van Lanschot 2018
Vastned Retail 2018
Vivoryon (voorheen Probiodrug) 2019 

Volta Finance fund including CLO (Collateralized Loan Obligations)
WDP 2019
Wereldhave, buy! 2020
Wolters Kluwer 2019

Yatra Capital Indian Real Estate, 2017: losing money, stopping? Book 7,5 E, Price 5,75 E.
2018 "As the Company has exited or is in the process of exiting all of its investments the shareholders passed a special resolution at its Annual General Meeting on September 17, 2018 to put the Company into liquidation and is in the process of realising its assets, settling liabilities and distributing the assets. Price EUR 3,5 cash payout Eur 4 to 4,40 in 2019? but not for people who buy the shares today (December 18th 2018)?

R.I.P.
Batenburg Techniek: Taken off the stock exchange for 46 Euros by van Puijenbroek family. Good price for investors:  http://sinaas.blogspot.com/2018/08/batenburg-techniek-graham-valuation.html
BinckBank 2019 Saxobank
Esperite: 2018 Stem Cell Bank losing money, selling shares. Price recently fell from 3 to 0,25
oktober 2019 falliet, koers: 0,046 geen handel.
Gemalto Thales offer 2018
Groothandelsgebouwen N.V. bought for EUR 56,92

Kardan 2019 June 2020: https://www.iex.nl/Nieuws/ANP-240620-111/Kardan-geeft-beursnotering-in-Amsterdam-op.aspx
KAS BANK 2019



Other countries:
Starbucks

Stern Groep N.V. share price and value guesstimate

Looks cheap, but too difficult pile? Stern has done a lot of deals, selling much of its businesses. With the profit the company paid out a EUR 3,50 dividend in 2019. Book value is EUR 27 and the market price is EUR 10...

The company and Chairman of the Board Henk van der Kwast are clear about the challenges facing the mobility sector and where they could have done better in the Annual Report: https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/stern-nl/09/stern-jaarrapport-2019.pdf 

SECTOR: [PASS]  Stern Groep is in car sales and mobility. Technology and financial stocks were considered too risky to invest in when this methodology was published. 

SALES: [PASS]  The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million.Stern Groep's sales of €996 million, based on 2019 sales, pass this test.

CURRENT RATIO:  [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. Stern Groep's current ratio €253m/€241m of 1 fails this test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL] For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that do not meet this criterion lack the financial stability that this methodology likes to see. The long-term debt for Stern Groep is €145 million, while the net current assets are €12 million. Stern Groep fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [PASS] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. Stern Groep's earnings have increased during the past years, but I don't have the figures from 10 years ago.

Earnings Yield:  [PASS] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. Stern Groep's E/P of 10% (using a guesstimate of EUR 1 Earnings per Share) passes this test.

Graham Number value: [PASS] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. Stern Groep has a Graham number =  √(15 x €1 EPS x 1,5 x €27 Book Value) = €27 

Dividend: ? 

PS: Today I Learned:

Stern has asked ABN Amro to be its "liquidity provider" instead of NIBC.   Which led me to the question: "What is a liquidity provider?"

The name itself seems to be a good description. More information in Dutch here https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liquiditeitsverschaffer

SnowWorld stock price and intrinsic business value

The stock price is significantly higher than the Offer 2 years ago: http://sinaas.blogspot.com/2018/11/snowworld-intrinsic-value-and-offer.html 

Coronacrisis: The first quarter was good and the SnowWorld slopes are open again, but not at 100%

SECTOR: [PASS]  SnowWorld is in retail and foodservice and neither a technology nor financial Company, and therefore this methodology is applicable. 

SALES: [FAIL] The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. SnowWorld's sales of €36 million, based on 2019 sales, fails this test.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. SnowWorld's current ratio €6,2m/ €9,9 of 0.6 fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL] For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that do not meet this criterion lack the financial stability that this methodology likes to see. The long-term debt for SnowWorld is €80 million, while the net current assets are - €4 million. SnowWorld fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [PASS]  Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. SnowWorld EPS grew by 100% over the past 8 years and passes this test.

Earnings Yield:  [PASS] [FAIL] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. SnowWorld's E/P of  6,6% (using the current Earnings) passes this test.

Graham Number value: [FAIL] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. SnowWorld has a Graham number of √(15 x €0,9 EPS x 1,5 x €8 Book Value) = €12,8

Dividend: 0 SnowWorld is lending and investing for growth, it makes sense not to pay out a dividend at the moment.

Conclusion: The shares seem fairly priced, but there is too much debt for a Graham Defensive Investor. 

Sif holding stock price and Benjamin Graham value

SECTOR: [PASS]  Sif  Holding is in offshore and neither a technology nor financial Company, and therefore this methodology is applicable. 

SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. Sif Holding's sales of €325 million, based on 2019 sales, pass this test.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. Sif Holding's current ratio €64m/ €76m of 0,8 fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL] For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that do not meet this criterion lack the financial stability that this methodology likes to see. The long-term debt for SIf Holding is €79 million, while the net current assets are - €12 million. Sif Holding fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [FAIL]  [PASS]  Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. I don't have Sif Holding's EPS from 10 years ago when it was a private company, therefore Sif Holding neither passes or failsfails this test.

Earnings Yield: [FAIL] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. Sif Holding's E/P of 1% (using last year's Earnings) fails this test.

Graham Number value:  [FAIL]  The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. Sif Holding has a Graham number of √(15 x €0,31 EPS x 1,5 x €3,5 Book Value) = €4,9

Dividend ? the company pays dividend when it can. 

SBM Offshore stock price and estimated Benjamin Graham value

In the long-term, renewable energy sources could be a threat.

Note: I (still) don't understand the numbers "directional" vs IFRS and reporting in $s for a Euro stock.

SECTOR: [PASS]  SBM is neither a technology nor financial Company, and therefore this methodology is applicable. 

SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. SBM's sales of €3 391 million, based on 2019 sales, pass this test. Sales have increased considerably lately.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. SBM's current ratio $2 3123m/$1 488m of 1.4 fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL] For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that do not meet this criterion lack the financial stability that this methodology likes to see. The long-term debt for SBM has decreased and is now €3 662 million, while the net current assets are €635 million. SBM fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [FAIL] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. SBM's EPS were negative in 2011, 2012 and 2017, therefore, SBM fails this test.

Earnings Yield: [PASS] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. SBM's E/P of 7% (using a mix of the average of 3 years and last year's Earnings) passes this test.

Graham Number value: [PASS] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. SBM has a Graham number of √(15 x €1,1 EPS x 1,5 x €11 Book Value) = €16

Dividend= €0,75/€13,4 = 5,6%

SBM Offshore is not a company for the Graham Defensive investor, the results are too unpredictable. 

Note in July 2020: Return on Equity and Capital employed is low at SBM. Warren Buffett's partner Charlie Munger wrote about this: 

“Over the long term, it’s hard for a stock to earn a much better return than the business which underlies it earns.

If the business earns 6% on capital over 40 years and you hold it for that 40 years, you’re not going to make much different than a 6% return—even if you originally buy it at a huge discount.

Conversely, if a business earns 18% on capital over 20 or 30 years, even if you pay an expensive looking price, you’ll end up with a fine result.”

Wolters Kluwer share price and intrinsic value

Notes from 2018: https://sinaas.blogspot.com/2018/12/wolterskluwer-intrinsic-value-based-on.html

Returning cash to shareholders via increasing dividends and share buybacks. Shares outstanding:

2017 291m 

2018 285m 

2019 276m

2020 269m  

Graham Defensive analysis based on Chapter 14 of The Intelligent Investor:

SECTOR: [PASS]  Wolters Kluwer is an information services company. 

SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. Wolter Kluwer's sales of €4 612 million, based on 2019 sales, pass this test.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. Wolter Kluwer's current ratio €2 476m/€3 809m of 0,7 is too low.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL] For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that do not meet this criterion lack the financial stability that this methodology likes to see. The long-term debt for Wolters Kluwer is €2 586 million, while the net current assets are - €1 333 million. Wolters Kluwer fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [PASS]  Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. Wolter Kluwer's earnings per share grew 250% over the past 10 years. 

Earnings Yield: [[FAIL] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. Wolters Kluwer's E/P of 3,5% (using last years Earnings) fails this test.

Graham Number value: [FAIL] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. Wolters Kluwer has a Graham number of √(15 x €2,5 EPS x 1,5 x €8 Book Value) = €21 

Dividend: €1,2/€70 = 1,7% 

Conclusion 2020: Price has increased significantly since 2018 EUR 70/EUR 53 = 32% even though I thought it was expensive at the time.  

RoodMicroTec not getting cash out for the Graham Defensive investor?

Update 2019: RoodMicroTec is a 50-year-old company, currently involved in ASIC chips. But it doesn't do:

-assembly

-design

or have a 

-wafer fab.

The company is not reliably profitable and the share price has fallen to EUR 0,17, the book value is EUR 0,02 per share. 

Warren Buffett says: “Any investment is worth all the cash you’re going to get out between now and judgment day discounted back to today."  

Recently if you are a RoodMicroTec owner, you have been putting cash into the company, instead of getting any out. The company takes money out of the market by selling tens of millions of shares. 

Update 2018: 2017 67 million shares x EUR 0,27 per share -> Market cap: EUR 18m

Company seems to be breakeven, sales are up towards EUR 18m per year. Price is 1x sales.

----------------------------------------------

RoodMicrotec is a small "semiconductor company supplying products (chips and packaged devices) and services."

In the past few years it has been losing money whilst selling shares to finance operations.

Share count:

2013 39 million shares

2014 43 million shares

2015 54 million shares

2016 63 millions shares

2019 75 million shares

Source: https://www.iex.nl/Aandeel-Koers/11956/RoodMicrotec/fundamentele-analyse.aspx 

In total 24 million shares sold to investors at an average price of roughly 20 cents each, resulting in 4,8 million Euros flowing into the company. Today total equity (book value) is only 4 million...

Shareholders are the only thing keeping this company from going bankrupt.

2018: Conclusion: Not a stock for the Graham Defensive Investor.

Relx Peter Lynch log chart compared to Benjamin Graham Defensive value chart

Relx formerly Reed Elsevier intrinsic

Stock prices were high around the turn of the century. Warren Buffett predicted low single digit return for the market for the period from 2000 to 2017. Here in this chart you can see that Relx is a good example of why that was the case. The EPS (Earnings per Share) have been increasing since 2002 but the price was so high in 2002 that the stock price hadn't really moved before 2017 (you did get dividends which are not included here, but then again neither are taxes or inflation.)

Note: This is a logarithmic chart the current price of EUR 20,55 is much closer to the 10 line than the 10 is to 1. 

Here is a chart of the same prices but compared to the Graham value which takes book value into account. Relx has a low book value, so the stock seems more expensive.

------------
Old Conclusion and analysis 2017 : The RELX Group earns a lot on its book value (it has a high return on equity), but it is not a stock for the Defensive investor, especially at the current price of over 17 Euro

SECTOR: [PASS]  RELX Group is neither a technology nor financial Company, and therefore this methodology is applicable. 

SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. RELX Group's sales of €7 355 million, based on 2019 sales, pass this test.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. RELX Group's current ratio €2 289m/€5 000m of 0.5 fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL]  For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that do not meet this criterion lack the financial stability that this methodology likes to see. The long-term debt for RELX Group is €7 385 million, while the net current assets are - €2 711 million. RELX Group fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [FAIL] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. RELX Group's profits have been flat over the past 10 years and fails this test.

Earnings Yield: [FAIL] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. RELX Group's E/P of 8% (using the last 3 years Earnings) fails this test.

Graham Number value: [FAIL] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. RELX Group has a Graham number of √(15 x €1,4 EPS x €1,27 Book Value) = €6 

Dividend: €0,45/€17,5 = 3%

Conclusion 2018: Too difficult pile.

Retail Estates notes

Interesting Belgian company which has been listed in Amsterdam since 2018. 

Has been growing a retail (out of town) real estate portfolio in a time where it has been fashionable to sell retail real estate because of the rise of E-commerce. (People have bought more online in the Netherlands than in Belgium in the past 2 decades). 

Good overview here: https://www.retailestates.com/en/investors/key-figures

For example how realistic is the share price?

Over-/undervaluation compared to net asset value IFRS

3/2020      3/2019      3/2018      3/2017      3/2016

-25,07%   31,01%     19,30%    34,51%     45,85%

Sales 2019 EUR 107m

Dividend: EUR 4,40 / EUR 62 = 7%

Portfolio EUR 1,65b strong growth during the financial crisis EUR 250m in 2008 and EUR 500m in 2011. Also bought real estate during the 2020 coronacrisis. 

Portfolio % growth faster than per share NAV % growth due to the sales of new shares, whilst paying out a dividend. 

Conclusion 2018 ( I wrote the name of the company incorrectly) was seemed expensive, but the share price and NAV have done much better than Wereldhave: https://sinaas.blogspot.com/2018/11/real-estates-share-price-and-intrinsic.html 

Retail Estates might book a loss in 2020 due to impairments linked to the coronacrisis?

Vivoryon previously known as Probiodrug

Notes June 29/6/2020

Not much sales, seems to have sold shares to finance expenses and increase book value to EUR 2,- Changed name. Price EUR 3,90 

Monday, November 05, 2018

Probiodrug note

2017: Probiodrug loss-making biotech, not a stock for the Defensive Investor
2018: stock price has dropped from EUR 17 to EUR 3,20

Book value per share? Equity has dropped from EUR 9m to 5m in the first half of the year. Could go to zero in the second half of 2018?

PostNL stock Price and Graham Value in the light of declining "value density"

In November 2018 I wrote: PostNL Mailing of letters is decreasing, but the shipment of parcels in increasing. 

Imagine how much money a PostNL truck full of envelopes is making in stamp income (@ around EUR 1 per letter) versus how much revenue a similar truck makes moving large packages (@ around EUR 7 per package).

"Value density" in Dutch is waardedichtheid. In this case PostNL (stamp) revenue per m3 moved. 

It seems to me moving letters is more profitable (especially if you have a monopoly).

Benjamin Graham Defensive Analysis

PostNL has a negative book value. Here I have put in a positive book value of 10 cents per share and used profits of continuing business. There are also legal issues concerning competition that I don't understand.

SECTOR: [PASS] PostNL is neither a technology nor financial Company, and therefore this methodology is applicable. 

SALES: [PASS]  The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. PostNL's sales of €2 841 million, based on 2019 sales, pass this test, but have declined.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. PostNL's current ratio €1 012m/€951 of 1.1 fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL]  For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that do not meet this criterion lack the financial stability that this methodology likes to see. The long-term debt for PostNL is €1 205 million, while the net current assets are  €61 million. PostNL fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [FAIL] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. EPS for PostNL were negative within the last 5 years and Earnings per Share have decreased over the last 10 years, therefore the company fails this criterion. 

EARNINGS YIELD: [FAIL] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. PostNL's E/P of 5% (using last year earnings) fails this test.

GRAHAM NUMBER VALUE:  [FAIL] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. PostNL has a Graham number of √(15 x €0,08 EPS x 1,5 x €0,1 Book Value) = €0,4 and fails this test.

Dividend: 0,08/1,7 = 5% ? The aim was "for a progressive dividend." this doesn't seem to have worked. The dividend was cut. https://www.deaandeelhouder.nl/nieuws/2020/06/02/beursblik-dividenduitkering-postnl-komt-dichterbij/