Ansgar John / Sinaas

DPA Groep N.V. 2022
Esperite: 2018 Stem Cell Bank losing money, selling shares. Price recently fell from 3 to 0,25
oktober 2019 falliet, koers: 0,046 geen handel.

FNG 2019 Failliet 2022 https://fngnv.com/17-02-2022-fng-nv-vraagt-faillissement-aan/
Gemalto Thales offer 2018

GeoJunxion formerly AND 2023 EUR 1,1 distribution

GrandVision 2019 EUR 28 offer DELISTED on 10/01/2022
Groothandelsgebouwen N.V. bought for EUR 56,92

Hunter Douglas 2021 bought for EUR 175

Intertrust 2021 taken private at EUR 20,-

ICT Group NV 2021 EUR 14,50 private

JDE PEET'S Jacobs Douwe Egberts 2025 offer EUR 31,85

Kardan 2019 June 2020: https://www.iex.nl/Nieuws/ANP-240620-111/Kardan-geeft-beursnotering-in-Amsterdam-op.aspx

KAS BANK 2019

Kiadis Pharma taken private in 2020

Klepierre cheap at €20? 2019 French

K. VolkerWessels 2019 taken private (again) in 2020

K. Wessanen 2019 buy out

Lucas Bols 2022 2023 Nolet buyout EUR 18 at Graham Value

Neways bought by Infestos

NIBC bought by Blackstone in 2020

Oranjewoud 2018 EUR 6 2022 https://www.tubantia.nl/enschede/sanderink-is-gesteggel-met-toezichthouder-afm-beu-en-haalt-oranjewoud-van-de-beurs~a1cadfeb/

Ordina 2022 bought at 42% premium

RoodMicrotec 2021

SnowWorld 2023 private at EUR 10,50
Yatra Capital 2020

Other countries:

Alibaba 2023
Starbucks

Thoughts on share prices: Peter Lynch and Nick Kraakman https://www.valuespreadsheet.com/blog/dangerous-sayings-about-stock-prices

Tuesday, May 12, 2026

Gemini doesn't Grok centen ipv procenten

Me : **"you cannot fight Aldi or Lidl on price" ? I think you can, if you pick your spots. Aldi especially seems to have forgotten the Deckungsbeitrag and Opportuniteitskosten framework the Albrecht brothers used? Champagne, salmon, PCs at "impossible" "kamikaze" margins make money boosting the bottom line whilst being sold under "breakeven" margin.**

Gemini AI :

> You are absolutely right. The assumption that you cannot compete with Aldi or Lidl on price is a lazy one. You can, provided you target the right coordinates.

> You have accurately identified a strategic drift. Modern Aldi has undeniably strayed from the strict, fundamental framework built by Karl and Theo Albrecht.

> Here is a breakdown of why your assessment is mechanically and strategically sound.

> ### The Albrecht Doctrine: Master the Fundamentals

> The original Aldi model was built on flawless execution and extreme simplicity—relying heavily on mastering the basics before adding any complexity.

> * **Deckungsbeitrag (Contribution Margin):** The Albrecht brothers did not obsess over high percentage margins; they cared about absolute cash contribution and rapid inventory turnover. Selling Medion PCs or tools at a "kamikaze" margin meant the percentage profit was practically zero. However, it generated a massive, immediate cash injection. More importantly, it functioned as the ultimate footfall driver. A customer came in for a cheap PC and left with a cart full of private-label groceries that carried a much higher aggregate contribution margin. The low-margin item effectively subsidized the acquisition cost of the customer.

> * **Opportuniteitskosten (Opportunity Cost):** In a hard discount model, shelf space is the most valuable asset. The original Aldi carried roughly 600 SKUs. Every single item had to justify its real estate through raw volume. If an item sat on the shelf, the opportunity cost of not stocking a faster-moving staple was unacceptable. This is why their "kamikaze" items were strictly "In and Out" promotions—sold from the pallet, gone in a day, leaving zero lingering opportunity cost.

> ### Aldi's Strategic Drift

> Aldi has lost some of this ruthless discipline. In their attempt to capture market share from traditional supermarkets, they have added mass and complexity:

> 1. **SKU Proliferation:** They have expanded their inventory to over 1,500 SKUs, including multiple brands for single product categories.

> 2. **Operational Complexity:** Adding fresh in-store bakeries, expanded organic produce, and complex refrigerated supply chains requires more labor and higher energy costs.

> 3. **Store Aesthetics:** Upgrading lighting, flooring, and marketing significantly raises overhead.

> When fixed and variable operating costs rise, the required average contribution margin across the store must also rise to cover them. The machine is heavier now. Because they have higher overhead, they can no longer afford to be the absolute cheapest on every single item.

> ### Executing the Strike

> Competitors can beat them by utilizing the old Aldi artillery against the modern Aldi infrastructure.

> * **Surgical Loss Leaders:** Pick highly visible, desirable items (like Champagne, premium salmon, or specific tech during the holidays) and price them strictly at or slightly below your own cost. The goal is not to make money on the item; the goal is entirely to drive traffic and break the consumer's psychological default that "Aldi is always cheapest."

> * **Forced Navigation:** Ensure the store layout forces the customer to walk past high-margin, high-turnover staples to reach these targeted promotions.

> * **Strict Timelines:** To avoid the opportunity cost of dead stock, these items must be highly limited. Once the pallet is empty, the space reverts to standard inventory.

> If a competitor has the discipline to run lean on specific, targeted categories, Aldi's broadened operational model leaves them vulnerable to exactly these kinds of pricing strikes.

> Looking at the current retail landscape, which specific product categories do you think offer the best tactical opportunity to undercut them right now?

Me : **No you don't understand. See https://youtu.be/jkiUjfp2_ro?is=vlEiGGSHlGmsB1i5**

Gemini AI :

> I missed the mark. I analyzed those items as loss leaders, but the video exposes the exact flaw in that thinking. It is the trap of comparing percentages instead of counting actual cash.

> Here is the correction based on the framework you pointed out.

> ### The Percentage Trap

> Traditional retail planning systems focus on a break-even gross margin percentage. If a store's expenses require a 20% average margin to cover rent and salaries, the system flags any item with a 5% margin as unprofitable. The outer scorecard dictates that the item is a loss.

> ### The Deckungsbeitrag Reality

> Expenses are paid in absolute currency, not percentages.

> If you sell a 1,000 Euro Medion PC at a "kamikaze" 5% margin, you generate 50 Euros of absolute gross profit (Deckungsbeitrag).

> If you sell a 1 Euro staple item at a massive 50% margin, you generate 50 cents.

> As the video demonstrates, selling the low-percentage, high-cash items generates far more actual money to cover your fixed expenses than selling multiple high-percentage items.

> ### The True Mechanism

> When the Albrecht brothers pushed PCs, salmon, and Champagne at prices that looked mathematically impossible, they were not subsidizing them as footfall drivers. They were bypassing the percentage margin entirely to generate massive, immediate cash contributions. Because the absolute cash yield per square meter (Opportunity Cost) was exceptionally high, these items were highly profitable in reality, even if they looked unprofitable on a percentage spreadsheet.

> Competitors who rely on percentage-based planning systems lock themselves out of this strategy. They refuse to stock these items, mistakenly believing they will lose money. To fight Aldi, you have to run the math on absolute cash generation, ignore the percentages."

Monday, May 11, 2026

Aalberts stock price and Graham Value

Conclusion april 2025: The balance sheet is not ideal, but the stock price @27 Euros for Aalberts seems like a good pick for the Defensive Investor.

May 2026 the stock PRICE has increased by 37% whilst the Graham VALUE has not really changed, and dividends have been paid out.

SECTOR: [PASS] Aalberts is neither a technology nor a financial company; therefore, this methodology is applicable.

SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size." This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. Aalberts' €3 090 million sales, based on 2025 sales, pass this test.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. Aalberts' current ratio €1 332m/€ 874m of 1,5 fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [FAIL] For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that meet this criterion display one of the attributes of a financially secure organization. The long-term debt for Aalberts is €1 000m while the net current assets are €458m million. Aalberts fails this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [PASS] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. Aalberts' EPS growth over that period of 100% passes the EPS growth test.

EARNINGS YIELD: [PASS] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. Aalberts's E/P of 7,6 % (using the average of last 3 years) passes this test.

GRAHAM NUMBER VALUE: [PASS] [FAIL] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. Aalberts has a Graham number of √(15 x €2,5 EPS x 1,5 x €23 Book Value) = €37

Dividend: EUR 1,15/37= 3%

Wednesday, May 06, 2026

The Hollow Men by Ryan Cohen

American capitalism is rotting from the head down. We have replaced the "Owner-Operator"—the risk-taker-with a new, parasitic class of corporate bureaucrat: The Risk-Free Insider. By "Insider," I am not referring to a specific title. I am referring to the entire administrative state that has captured the modern corporation. This includes the Directors who exist solely to collect fees, the Executives who exist solely to collect bonuses, and the Managers who exist solely to hire consultants. These are the hollow men of the boardroom. They are masters of PowerPoint. They wear the right suits. They say the right buzzwords about "governance" and "ESG." But they are mercenaries fighting a war with someone else’s ammunition. In a functioning economy, authority is tied to liability. If you make a bad decision, you lose your own money. That fear of loss is the only thing that keeps a business honest. It forces you to cut waste, obsess over the customer, and stay late to fix what is broken. Today, we have severed that link. We have rigged the game so that heads, the Insider wins; tails, the shareholder loses. If the stock goes up, the Insider collects a massive performance bonus. If the stock crashes due to their own incompetence, they are fired with a "Golden Parachute" worth tens of millions. They are gambling with the house’s money, and they never leave the table poorer than they arrived. This looting starts in the boardroom. We have normalized a "Country Club" culture where directors are selected based on social profiling rather than their ability to build a business. The modern board member is often a professional tourist—paid an average of $350,000 a year. Let’s be brutally honest about what that number represents. The average director is paid nearly five times the GDP per capita of the United States. They earn more for attending four quarterly lunches than the vast majority of Americans earn in five years of hard labor. And for what? Most of these directors are "over-boarded," sitting on three or four boards simultaneously. They treat directorships as a gig economy for the elite. They fly in, rubber-stamp a compensation package they didn't read, and fly out. They collect checks from companies they do not understand, do not use, and certainly do not love. They are not there to ask hard questions. They are there to be collegial. They are there to protect the other Insiders. And what happens when these boards hire executives who also have no personal capital at risk? We get the Delegation Economy. When a Risk-Free Insider faces a crisis—bloated expenses, a broken supply chain, or a stale product—they do not roll up their sleeves. They hire a consultant. They pay a strategy firm millions of shareholder dollars to produce a 100-page deck telling them what they already know. This is not management. It is intellectual money laundering. They use shareholder capital to buy an insurance policy for their own careers. If the plan fails, they can blame the consultants. They delegate the work because they are terrified of the responsibility. They would rather preside over a slow, comfortable decline than risk a bold mistake. While American Insiders are busy optimizing their severance packages, our global competitors are optimizing their products. They are not slowed down by bureaucracy. They are not waiting for a slide deck. They are outworking us. If we continue to fill our C-suites with administrators instead of operators, we will lose our edge. We will see iconic American franchises hollowed out by fees, managed for the benefit of the Insiders, while the true owners—the shareholders—are left holding the bag. The time for polite governance is over. If we want to save the American economy from mediocrity, we must demand a return to the "Owner’s Mentality." We need leaders who treat shareholder capital with the same reverence they treat their own savings. The era of the Risk-Free Insider must end.

Monday, May 04, 2026

ACOMO Graham Value and Share Price and buy / sell lines for next year

SECTOR: [PASS] Acomo is neither a technology nor financial Company, and therefore this methodology is applicable.

SALES: [PASS] The investor must select companies of "adequate size". This includes companies with annual sales greater than €260 million. Acomo's sales of more than EUR 1 463 million, based on 2025 sales, pass this test.

CURRENT RATIO: [FAIL] [PASS] The current ratio must be greater than or equal to 2. Companies that meet this criterion are typically financially secure and defensive. Acomo's current ratio €715m/€411m of 1.7 just fails the test.

LONG-TERM DEBT IN RELATION TO NET CURRENT ASSETS: [PASS] ? For industrial companies, long-term debt must not exceed net current assets (current assets minus current liabilities). Companies that do not meet this criterion lack the financial stability that this methodology likes to see. The long-term debt for Acomo is €140 million (of which some leases), while the net current assets are €303 million. Acomo passes this test.

LONG-TERM EPS GROWTH: [PASS] Companies must increase their EPS by at least 30% over a ten-year period and EPS must not have been negative for any year within the last 5 years. Companies with this type of growth tend to be financially secure and have proven themselves over time. Acomo's EPS growth was more than 50% over the past 10 years, Acomo passes this test.

Earnings Yield: [PASS] The Earnings/Price (inverse P/E) %, based on the lesser of the current Earnings Yield or the Yield using average earnings over the last 3 fiscal years, must be "acceptable", which this methodology states is greater than 6,5%. Stocks with higher earnings yields are more defensive by nature. Acomo's E/P of 8% (using last 3 years Earnings) passes this test.

Graham Number value: [PASS] The Price/Book ratio must also be reasonable. That is the Graham number value must be greater than the market price. Acomo has a Graham number of √(15 x €2 EPS x 1,5 x €14,9 Book Value) = €26

Dividend: €1,3/€25,9 = 5%

Conclusion 2023: @21 Euros The merger seems to be going well. Seems like a goog pick for a Graham Defensive investor

Conclusion 2026: Seems to be fairly. Not a screaming buy at EUR 26.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Leer Beleggen Als Warren Buffett" Dollar Tree voorbeeld blz 135 omgezet voor Acomo

Winst per aandeel: EUR 2,30

KW gemiddeld: 14,4

Verwachte winst groei per jaar 10%

Met deze gegevens in de hand kunnen we een verwacht

koersdoel voor de komende vijf jaar berekenen:

2,3 winst per aandeel *14,4 koers/winst verhouding *1,10^5 winst groei over 5 jaar = EUR 53,3 (2,3*14,4*1,10^5= 53,3)

Stel, we streven naar een jaarlijks verwacht rendement van 20+%. In dat geval dienen we de verwachte koers te delen door

2,5 (1,2^5 = 2,5). Daarmee komen we op een koers van EUR 21,3 (53,3/2,5) = EUR 21,33

Laten we stellen dat we tot verkopen overgaan wanneer het verwachte

rendement niet meer dan 8% betreft. In dat geval dienen we de koers te delen door 1,47 (1,08^5 = 1,47). In dat geval bedraagt een verkoopdoel

US EUR 36,25 (53,3/1,47 = 36,25)

De koers lijnen die hierbij horen met punten per jaar:

Monday, April 20, 2026

QXO stock Brad Jacobs notes by Perplexity AI

QXO has an unusual history that largely explains its extreme price swings: it started as a tiny tech company, then became a Brad Jacobs “blank‑check style” platform loaded with cash but with very little free float, which created a one‑off squeeze and crash, and is now evolving into a roll‑up of building‑products distributors with ongoing volatility driven by capital raises, acquisitions, and valuation concerns.companiesmarketcap+2

Brief history of the QXO ticker

The legal entity behind today’s QXO traded for years as a small software/tech company (earlier known as SilverSun Technologies) with a low share price and modest market cap.investing+1
In 2023–2024 the vehicle was effectively repurposed as Brad Jacobs’ new acquisition platform, rebranded as QXO, Inc., with a strategy to build a very large distributor of building products in North America.finance.yahoo+2
At that point, the company held several billion dollars of cash and cash‑equivalents on its balance sheet but only a tiny percentage of shares actually floated; more than 99% of shares were held by insiders and large investors under lock‑up or other restrictions.acadian-asset
In 2024–2025 it began to execute on the roll‑up strategy and is now described as a publicly traded distributor of roofing, waterproofing and complementary building products in the U.S., backed by large sponsors such as Apollo, with a stated goal of becoming the leading consolidator in an $~\$800$ billion market.finance.yahoo+2

An illustration of the long‑term price range: the all‑time low end‑of‑day close was about 6.53 USD in 2016, while the all‑time high was over 235 USD in June 2024.companiesmarketcap

The extreme 2024 spike and collapse

The most dramatic swings in QXO occurred around mid‑2024 and are largely a microstructure/float story rather than fundamentals:

One analysis notes that QXO (then trading on Nasdaq) ran up to around 290 USD in June and then collapsed to roughly 12 USD by early August.acadian-asset
During the spike, only about 0.1% of shares were freely trading, with the remaining 99.9% locked with large investors, some of whom were legally unable to sell.acadian-asset
In June, QXO privately sold additional shares to institutions at 9.14 USD on the same day that public market participants were paying around 205 USD, showing how disconnected the quoted price was from what informed buyers were willing to pay in size.acadian-asset
Once QXO filed the necessary SEC registration on 29 July, previously restricted holders could sell, and supply hit the market, leading to a predictable collapse in the share price and market cap (from roughly 119 billion USD to about 5 billion USD on one estimate).acadian-asset
Shorting the stock while it was overvalued was effectively impossible at scale because borrow costs were astronomically high; one broker quoted an annualized short fee of about 4,815% at the end of July, which is described as likely the highest short fee ever recorded.acadian-asset

In other words, the 2024 “bubble” and crash were driven by a combination of minuscule free float, severe constraints on the natural sellers, extreme short‑borrow costs, and a later unlocking of a huge block of stock—classic ingredients for a squeeze rather than a fundamental repricing.

Recent price swings and catalysts

After the float normalized, QXO’s volatility has been driven more by fundamentals, capital structure moves, and news flow around its roll‑up strategy:

The stock has continued to trade in a wide 52‑week range (roughly 12–28 USD in one 2026 analysis), and was recently around the high‑teens to mid‑20s, with about a 15% drawdown over the last six months in that period.tikr
In January 2026, QXO jumped more than 20% intraday on news that an Apollo‑led consortium would invest about 1.2 billion USD via convertible preferred shares, with an initial conversion price set at a premium (around 18%) to the prior close, providing fresh capital for acquisitions.finance.yahoo
Shortly afterward, the company conducted additional common‑stock offerings; the share price dropped on the offerings themselves, but analysts remained broadly positive, citing a robust M&A pipeline and assigning upside to their target prices vs. the then‑current quote.msn
There have also been shorter‑term moves tied to “macro‑adjacent” narratives; for example, one recent pop of roughly 9–12% intraday was attributed by commentators to investors viewing certain geopolitical developments as favorable for QXO’s end markets or strategy.finance.yahoo
Despite the growth story, QXO has operated with very low profitability so far (LTM EBIT margins just over 1% and negative net earnings in one 2026 review), leading to concern that the aggressive acquisition program plus elevated valuation may not translate quickly into meaningful earnings, which adds to volatility as sentiment swings between optimism and skepticism.simplywall+1

Key current drivers of swings

Capital raises and dilution: Repeated equity and preferred issuances to fund acquisitions shift perceptions about dilution and cost of capital, often causing sharp up or down moves around announcements.msn+1
Acquisition expectations: The entire thesis is based on a rapid roll‑up; any perceived acceleration or slowdown in deal activity (or quality of targets) is quickly reflected in the price.tikr+1
Valuation vs. weak current earnings: The stock often trades on forward narratives and private‑equity style roll‑up math, while reported profitability remains thin, so small changes in sentiment about future margins can move the equity a lot.simplywall+1
Still‑developing shareholder base: Large shifts by a few concentrated institutional holders (e.g., funds cutting positions by 70–80% or more) have been cited as contributors to volatility, as the shareholder base is not yet fully “mature.”tikr

How to think about the swings as an investor

The 2024 spike to ~290 USD and collapse to low‑teens was primarily a float/lock‑up/short‑cost anomaly, not a reflection of business value; using that range as an anchor for valuation is misleading.companiesmarketcap+1
Today’s swings are more typical of an early‑stage roll‑up with a promotional but credible sponsor: valuation rests heavily on execution of acquisitions and margin expansion, so news on funding, deals, and integration drives the stock disproportionately.morningstar+3
From a risk‑management point of view, position sizing and scenario analysis around capital needs, dilution, and integration risk are more important than historical price extremes, which were largely mechanical rather than fundamental.simplywall+2

a simple scenario tree (organic growth, acquisition pace, margin trajectory) to back‑solve QXO intrinsic value today:

Here is a simple, high‑level scenario tree for QXO that links organic growth, acquisition pace, and margin trajectory to an illustrative range of intrinsic values per share today.simplywall+3

I’ll keep it conceptual and use rough numbers so you can adapt it in your own model.

Step 1 – Anchor: current scale and market view

QXO is already a multi‑billion‑revenue distributor after Beacon and Kodiak, with 2026 revenue guidance or external estimates in the ~11–12 billion USD range and EBITDA margins around 10–11% on recent quarters.simplywall+1
A detailed narrative model for QXO’s strategy assumes:
- Base 2026 revenue ~11.5 billion USD
- Organic growth ~3% per year
- Additional ~10 billion USD of acquired revenue over 2027–2031
- Resulting 2031 revenue around 24 billion USD (about 15% CAGR) with margin expansion from operational improvements.simplywall+1
Several independent DCF‑style models currently estimate intrinsic value in a band of roughly 30–60 USD per share, often with a “base case” in the high 20s to mid‑50s, versus a market price that has traded around the high teens to mid‑20s in early 2026.alphaspread+3

You can think of that 30–60 USD range as a sanity‑check for any scenario tree you build: if you are far outside it, it should be because your assumptions are materially more bullish or bearish than these consensus‑type models.

Step 2 – Define three axes and states

We’ll define three levers:

Organic growth (org):
- Low: ~0–2% revenue CAGR (industry‑like or slightly below)simplywall
- Base: ~3–4% CAGR (roughly in line with assumptions like the 3% in the 24 billion USD by 2031 narrative)simplywall
- High: ~5–6% CAGR (share gains + underlying market growth)
Acquisition pace (M&A):
- Low: ~5 billion USD of acquired revenue over ~5 years (half the 10 billion USD “moderate” path modelled in some narratives)simplywall
- Base: ~10 billion USD of acquired revenue 2027–2031 (the “mid” assumption from the 24 billion USD scenario)simplywall
- High: ~15 billion USD+ over the same period (faster consolidation, closer to the more ambitious elements of QXO’s long‑term story, though still below the 50 billion USD revenue “moonshot” discussed elsewhere).ainvest+1
EBITDA margin trajectory (margin):
- Low: ~9–10% steady‑state (little or no improvement from current adjusted levels)ainvest
- Base: ~11–12% (modest improvement from procurement, AI‑driven logistics, integration synergies)ainvest+1
- High: ~13–14% (top‑quartile building‑products distributor, strong economies of scale and tech leverage, roughly consistent with more optimistic commentary about doubling Beacon‑legacy EBITDA over time).ainvest+1

Step 3 – Three illustrative core scenarios

To keep this practical, pick three combinations and back‑solve indicative intrinsic values using a simple “market‑style” multiple on 2031 earnings discounted back to today.

1) Bear / execution‑light scenario

Assumptions:
- Organic: Low (≈2% CAGR)
- M&A: Low (~5 billion USD added by 2031)
- Margin: Low (~10% EBITDA)
Implied 2031 revenue:
- 2026 base ~11.5 billion USD × 1.02^5 ≈ 12.7 billion
- Plus acquisitions 5 billion → ~17.7 billion USD total.simplywall
EBITDA and earnings:
- EBITDA ≈ 10% → ~1.8 billion USD
- After interest, tax, etc., a rough rule of thumb might be net income ≈ 50–60% of EBITDA if leverage is moderate → say ~1.0–1.1 billion USD.
Valuation:
- If the market regards this as a “standard” distributor with limited growth, a 12–14× P/E on 2031 might be reasonable.alphaspread+1
- Equity value in 2031 ≈ 1.0–1.1 billion × 13× ≈ 13–14.5 billion USD.
- Discounting back five years at 10% gives a present value of roughly 8–9 billion USD.
Per‑share intrinsic value (today):
- Different public models imply equity values consistent with ~11–15 USD per share in bearish setups.gurufocus+1
- So this Bear scenario is directionally in that ~10–15 USD band.

Interpretation: This is roughly “slow consolidation, margins stall,” where QXO ends up a large but not especially special distributor and trades on mid‑teens earnings multiples.

2) Base / disciplined roll‑up scenario

Assumptions (close to what some narrative and DCF models implicitly use):
- Organic: Base (~3% CAGR)
- M&A: Base (~10 billion USD acquired 2027–2031)
- Margin: Base (~11.5–12% EBITDA)
Implied 2031 revenue:
- 11.5 billion × 1.03^5 ≈ 13.3–14.1 billion USD
- Plus 10 billion of acquired → ≈ 23–24 billion USD, essentially matching the 24 billion USD scenario described in detailed narratives.simplywall+1
EBITDA and earnings:
- EBITDA ≈ 11.5–12% → ≈ 2.6–2.8 billion USD
- Net income at ~55–60% of EBITDA → ≈ 1.4–1.6 billion USD.
Valuation:
- If the market still sees QXO as a growthy consolidator with a strong operator at the helm, a mid‑teens to high‑teens P/E on 2031 earnings (say 16–18×) is plausible.simplywall+2
- Equity value in 2031: 1.4–1.6 billion × ~17× ≈ 24–27 billion USD.
- Discounted five years at 10% → ≈ 15–17 billion USD today.
Per‑share intrinsic value (today):
- Multiple independent DCF analyses arrive in the 30–60 USD band, with base cases around 29–60 USD per share depending on discount rate and terminal assumptions.sahmcapital+3
- This Base scenario lines up roughly with ~30–40+ USD as a reasonable “middle” outcome if execution is solid but not heroic.

Interpretation: This is “Jacobs does his usual playbook at a disciplined pace,” with meaningful consolidation, modest organic growth, and moderate margin lift; market rewards it with an above‑average but not bubble multiple.

3) Bull / high‑execution scenario

Assumptions:
- Organic: High (~5–6% CAGR)
- M&A: High (~15 billion USD acquired by 2031)
- Margin: High (~13–14% EBITDA)
Implied 2031 revenue:
- 11.5 billion × 1.05^5 ≈ 14.7–14.8 billion USD
- Plus 15 billion of acquired → ~30 billion USD or more in revenue, still below the most aggressive 50 billion USD longer‑dated ambitions.ainvest+1
EBITDA and earnings:
- EBITDA ≈ 13–14% → ≈ 3.9–4.2 billion USD
- Net income at ~60% of EBITDA → ≈ 2.3–2.5 billion USD.
Valuation:
- If this plays out and the market continues to view QXO as a high‑quality compounder with runway, a 18–22× P/E on 2031 could be justifiable (especially if growth and reinvestment prospects extend beyond 2031).tikr+2
- Equity value 2031: ≈ 2.3–2.5 billion × 20× ≈ 46–50 billion USD.
- Discounted five years at 10% → ≈ 28–31 billion USD today.
Per‑share intrinsic value (today):
- More optimistic research pieces that bake in very rapid scaling and high margins imply target prices that are several‑hundred percent above current quotes, in some cases >200 USD per share over a 2–3 year horizon.tikr
- In a 2031‑anchored Bull scenario, a present‑value band of perhaps 60–100 USD+ per share is directionally consistent with those highly optimistic DCFs and return targets.simplywall+3

Interpretation: This is “near‑XPO‑level execution”: fast deal cadence, strong integration, and clear strategic moat; the market applies a premium compounding multiple.

Scenario tree summary (conceptual table)

To keep it simple, you can think in a grid like this (numbers are indicative bands, not precise valuations):

Scenario	Organic CAGR	Acquired revenue by 2031	EBITDA margin in 2031	Implied 2031 revenue	Rough today intrinsic value band
Bear	~2%	~5 billion USD	~10%	~18 billion USD	~10–15 USD per share gurufocus+1
Base	~3–4%	~10 billion USD	~11.5–12%	~23–24 billion USD	~30–40+ USD per share alphaspread+3
Bull	~5–6%	~15 billion USD	~13–14%	~30 billion USD+	~60–100+ USD per share tikr+3

These bands are chosen so that the Base line roughly matches the “base case” intrinsic values computed by various DCF models (high 20s to 60 USD), while the Bear and Bull sit on either side in a way that reflects materially worse or better execution than those models assume.simplywall+3

How to use this practically

Position sizing: Decide how much probability you assign to each scenario, then calculate an expected value and compare to the current price; if the market is pricing in something close to Bear while you see Base as more likely, that’s your edge. Several analyses currently conclude the stock trades well below their DCF‑derived base‑case values, implying the market discounts execution heavily.sahmcapital+3
Update levers over time:
- Upward revision to Beacon/Kodiak margin potential or evidence of synergies pushes you towards higher‑margin branches.ainvest+1
- Aggressive but well‑priced deals with good integration move you from Low to Base/High M&A nodes.
- Any sign of integration strain, acquisition indigestion, or structurally lower returns on capital pushes the path back towards Bear.
Check against external models: When you plug in your own detailed assumptions, compare your per‑share outputs to the 30–60 USD “consensus DCF band” and ask whether your differences are really justified by different views on growth, M&A pace, or margins, or whether you’re implicitly assuming a very different multiple/discount‑rate structure.simplywall+3

If you want, I can next take a concrete current share price (e.g., the latest close) and walk through an explicit probability‑weighted intrinsic value calculation using more precise numbers for share count, net debt, and discount rate.