Monday, April 13, 2099

Valuation of all stocks listed in Holland AEX All Share AAX: Benjamin Graham Defensive Investor method

Warren Buffett: "Well, start with the A’s." https://live.euronext.com/en/product/indices/NL0000249100-XAMS#index-composition

Click on the companies below for Graham Evaluation:

Aalberts Industries 2024
ABN AMRO 2024
Ahold Delhaize 2024 
Accsys Technologies 2024
Adux: French holding company, no English or Dutch info? https://www.adux.com/en/investors/
Allfunds Group PLC 2024
Alumexx 2022 30 april 2025 cijfers? (voorheen Phelix, Inverko, Newconomy) 
Bever Holding 2022 
Boussard & Gavaudan Holding Ltd. An expensive hedge fund.
CABKA (Dutch Star Two SPAC) 2022 March 18, 2025 results
CVC Capital Partners PLC
DGB Group 2025 
DSM-Firmenich 2022
Global InterConnection Group Ltd
New Amsterdam Invest NV
Nepi Rockcastle NV

Accell Group 2020  taken private at EUR 58 in 2022, great price for shareholders. 
Altice 2020 end of December 2020
Apollo Alternative Assets 2019  delisted on December 28, 2020 and liquidated.
Batenburg Techniek: Taken off the stock exchange for 46 Euros by van Puijenbroek family. Good price for investors:  http://sinaas.blogspot.com/2018/08/batenburg-techniek-graham-valuation.html
BinckBank 2019 Saxobank
Beter Bed Holding 2021 bought for EUR 5,74 per share
Boskalis Westminster Koninklijke 2021 bought in 2022 by HAL Trust for EUR 33 per share
Brill, Koninklijke 2022 private after more than 100 years 2023.
Curetis 2019 traded May 2020 for EUR 0,29
DPA Groep N.V. 2022
Esperite: 2018 Stem Cell Bank losing money, selling shares. Price recently fell from 3 to 0,25
oktober 2019 falliet, koers: 0,046 geen handel.
GeoJunxion formerly AND 2023 EUR 1,1 distribution
Hunter Douglas 2021 bought for EUR 175
K. VolkerWessels 2019 taken private (again) in 2020 
Lucas Bols 2022 2023 Nolet buyout EUR 18 at Graham Value
SnowWorld 2023 private at EUR 10,50
Yatra Capital 2020

Other countries:

Thoughts on share prices: Peter Lynch and Nick Kraakman https://www.valuespreadsheet.com/blog/dangerous-sayings-about-stock-prices

Monday, January 19, 2026

100 quotes for life

Thanks to Norman Rentrop for yearly sending 100 quotes for the year. 

"For every decision in life there is a good reason... and a real reason." JP Morgan

You can lead a man to knowledge,  but you can't make him think. 

"Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit soars to consider truth." Pope John Paul II Fides et Ration

"Price is what you pay. Value is what you get." Benjamin Graham 

"If you don't believe in miracles, you are not a realist." David Ben-Gurion, the primary founder and first Prime Minister of Israel. via Jannie Mouton de Boere Buffett.

"Nun verdrieget jug." Brenninkmeijer family motto 

"Get along among yourselves, each of you doing your part. Our counsel is that you warn the freeloaders to get a move on. Gently encourage the stragglers, and reach out for the exhausted, pulling them to their feet. Be patient with each person, attentive to individual needs. And be careful that when you get on each other’s nerves you don’t snap at each other. Look for the best in each other, and always do your best to bring it out." 
1 Thessalonians 5:15 (MSG)




Friday, January 16, 2026

Dividend Aristocrats as an investment for Sophia Augustinus

Assuming a $1,000,000 investment in the S&P 500 Dividend Aristocrats Index at the beginning of 2005, without reinvestment of dividends, the estimated annual dividends received (based on historical index performance and an annualized dividend growth rate of 8.1%) are as follows:

- 2005: $23,560
- 2006: $25,470
- 2007: $27,530
- 2008: $29,760
- 2009: $32,150
- 2010: $34,750
- 2011: $37,560
- 2012: $40,580
- 2013: $43,870
- 2014: $47,420
- 2015: $51,260
- 2016: $55,410
- 2017: $59,890
- 2018: $64,740
- 2019: $69,980
- 2020: $75,650
- 2021: $81,780
- 2022: $88,400
- 2023: $95,560
- 2024: $103,300
- 2025: $111,670

The total dividends received from 2005 to the end of 2025 would be approximately $1,178,670.
Source Grok 

Monday, January 05, 2026

Het verhaal van de Gottrocks-familie, verteld door Warren Buffett

Stel je eens voor dat alle aandelen van alle Amerikaanse bedrijven – en dat zijn er duizenden – altijd in handen zijn van één grote familie. Laten we ze de Gottrocks noemen. (Je raadt al waarom: ze hebben "got rocks", ze zijn steenrijk!)

Generatie na generatie bezit deze enorme familie – met broers, zussen, neven, nichten, ooms en tantes – 100% van corporate America. Elk jaar oogsten ze de vruchten van hun bezit: alle winsten die de bedrijven maken en alle dividenden die worden uitgekeerd. Dat was in 2005 zo'n 700 miljard dollar per jaar. Na belastingen wordt de familie elk jaar rijker met precies dat bedrag. Ze groeien allemaal even hard, niemand klaagt, harmonie alom. Gewoon zitten, ontspannen en genieten van de groei van de economie. Een winner's game, zoals Buffett het noemt.

Maar op een dag komen er een paar gladde praters aan de deur. We noemen ze de Helpers (de "Hulpjes"). Deze snelle jongens overtuigen een paar "slimme" familieleden dat ze hun neven en nichten kunnen verslaan door slim te handelen: verkoop aandelen van het ene bedrijf aan een familielid en koop er aandelen van een ander bedrijf voor terug.

De Helpers bieden natuurlijk aan om al dat koop- en verkoopwerk te doen... tegen een kleine vergoeding, uiteraard. Hoe meer de familieleden onderling handelen, hoe groter de hap die de Helpers uit de taart nemen. De familie merkt het eerst niet, want de totale taart groeit nog steeds door de winsten van de bedrijven. Maar hun eigen stuk wordt langzaam kleiner.

Na een tijdje begint de familie te mopperen: "Hé, we worden niet meer zo snel rijk als vroeger!" De Helpers zien hun kans en komen met een briljant idee: "Jullie hebben managers nodig – zoals wij! – om professioneel te helpen kiezen welke aandelen je moet kopen en verkopen." Dus huren ze manager-Helpers in, die op hun beurt weer de broker-Helpers gebruiken om de transacties uit te voeren.

Resultaat? Nog een extra laag Helpers die een hap uit de taart nemen. De familie wordt steeds ongelukkiger, want hun vermogen groeit amper meer.

Uiteindelijk komen er hyper-Helpers: consultants die de familie adviseren welke manager-Helpers ze moeten inhuren. En natuurlijk tegen een flinke vergoeding.

Buffett sluit af met een knipoog: als Sir Isaac Newton niet alleen een genie in natuurkunde was geweest, maar ook een slimme belegger, had hij misschien een vierde wet van beweging bedacht: **Voor beleggers als geheel nemen de rendementen af naarmate de activiteit toeneemt.**

De moraal, met Buffets droge humor: Hoe meer je schudt, handelt en "geholpen" wordt, hoe minder er overblijft voor jou. Blijf gewoon zitten, houd vast aan de hele markt en laat de bedrijven het werk doen. Dan krijg je – netto – het beste rendement. De rest is vaak gewoon een duur circus waar alleen de Helpers rijk van worden.

Een typisch Buffett-verhaal: simpel, grappig en pijnlijk waar. 😏

Tuesday, December 30, 2025

Cheatsheet Manus and Gemini AI

The Contribution Profit (cp) framework (€5.00) is the better answer for retail management and decision-making.

While the first answer (€2.58) satisfies a mathematical percentage (the 2% net margin), it is strategically flawed in a real-world store environment. 

Here is why the Contribution Profit approach is superior:
1. The "Shelf Space" Reality (Opportunity Cost)
In a store, your most constrained resource is not usually "percentage margin," but physical space (shelf meters or floor area).
If you sell the non-sustainable product at €2.58, you earn €1.58 in contribution.
If you sell the sustainable product at €8.00, you earn €4.00 in contribution.
The Result: By choosing the €2.58 price, you are losing €2.42 in profit for every single unit that occupies that space. This is a massive Opportunity Cost.

2. Fixed Costs vs. Variable Percentages
Operating expenses (SG&A) like rent, electricity, and staff salaries are largely fixed in the short term. They don't care about your percentages; they care about absolute Euros.
The €5.00 price ensures that the non-sustainable product carries its "fair share" of the store's overhead, just like the sustainable one does.
At €2.58, the product is "profitable" on paper (2%), but it contributes so little absolute cash that you would need to sell 2.5 times more volume just to match the cash contribution of the sustainable product.

3. Avoiding the "Race to the Bottom"
Using only percentage margins often leads retailers to underprice low-cost items. If you price at €2.58, you are essentially subsidizing the low-cost product with the profit from higher-value items. The €5.00 price reflects the true value of the transaction and the service your store provides.

Summary Comparison

Net Profit Model (€2.58): Focuses on financial ratios and top-down averages.
Contribution Model (€5.00): Focuses on cash flow, space productivity, and bottom-up opportunity cost.

Verdict: Use €5.00. It treats your store as a collection of profit-generating assets (SKUs) and ensures that every unit sold justifies its place on your shelf.


| Name                | Institution                     | Key Contribution                                                                                                                                                                |
| :------------------ | :------------------------------ | :------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **Paul Farris**     | University of Virginia (Darden) | A global authority on marketing metrics. He pioneered research into how retail space productivity should be measured beyond simple gross margins.                               |
| **Norm Borin**      | Cal Poly                        | Co-authored seminal studies with Farris comparing **DPP** with other SKU productivity measures, proving that absolute contribution is a better predictor of store health.       |
| **Tensie Whelan**   | NYU Stern                       | Director of the Center for Sustainable Business. Her team developed the **Sustainable Market Share Index**, which tracks the superior profit potential of sustainable products. |
| **Bryan Bollinger** | NYU Stern                       | Researches the "Profit Potential and Availability" of sustainable products, specifically how retailers can optimize pricing to balance premiums with volume.                    |


Based on the principles you’ve outlined in your work—specifically the critique of "Percentage-based management" and the "SG&A Tax"—the answer changes fundamentally depending on which lens we use.

1. The "Conventional" (Incorrect) Answer

As calculated in the previous step, using standard retail accounting logic (where we apply a flat 53% overhead to every product):

  • The Price is €4.

  • Logic: At €4, the product has a 50% margin. When you subtract the 53% SG&A, it shows a -3% loss, just like the sustainable one.


2. Your Answer (The Deckungsbeitrag Perspective)

If we apply the logic from your papers—shifting the focus from Percentages to Absolute Contribution (Cash)—the answer is different.

In your "Breakthrough" booklet, you argue that a product should be judged by the absolute money it puts into the till (the "BCP Fund") to cover fixed costs, rather than whether it meets an arbitrary percentage hurdle.

ProductRetail PriceFactory CostContribution (Cash)
Sustainable€8.00€4.00€4.00
Other€6.00€2.00€4.00

The Answer:

To be equally profitable in terms of absolute cash contribution, the "Other" product should be priced at €6.00.

Why €6.00?

  • At €6, the "Other" product generates €4 in absolute Deckungsbeitrag, exactly the same as the Sustainable product.

  • Because you sell exactly the same quantity of both, they both contribute the exact same amount of cash to pay your rent, salaries, and electricity.

  • The conventional accountant would say the "Other" product is "better" because it has a 66% margin (), while the sustainable one only has 50% (). Your work highlights that this is an illusion: the bank accepts Euros, not percentages.

Your Core Thesis: By forcing the "Other" product down to €4 (the conventional answer), the retailer is unnecessarily throwing away €2 of profit per unit simply to satisfy a flawed percentage-based accounting model.

Would you like me to expand on how this "Fixed-Margin-Trap" specifically penalizes sustainable innovation in the C&A context you've researched?